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NEW TECHNOLOGY, THE DEATH OF THE BIGLAW MONOPOLY
AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER PROFESSIONAL
Dr. Michael Guihot*
Much has been written recently about new technology
disrupting1 the traditional law firm model of providing legal
services.2 Susskind and Susskind predicted the failure of professions,
including the legal profession, due in large part to the external
pressure of disruptive technology.3 However, concentrating blame
on the technology is misguided; it blames the tool used to disrupt
rather than the root causes of the disruption. In short, computers do
not kill lawyers. Neither is the disruption aimed at the profession as
such, but rather at the business models of modern day legal
practices that have developed under the auspices of the profession.
Under the guise of a profession, the legal profession has established
the barriers to entry that have allowed lawyers to hold a monopoly
on providing legal services. The monopoly has allowed law firms to
develop business models through which they have been able to
*

Senior Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology. Before entering
academia, the author spent 10 years in legal practice, including as in-house
counsel and as a partner in a law firm. Thank you to my colleagues Kylie
Pappalardo, Leon Wolff and Judith McNamara for reviewing early drafts of this
paper and providing helpful comments.
1
“‘Disruption’ describes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer
resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses.”
Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What is
Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, at 46.
2
See, e.g., Jason Koebler, Is Artificial Intelligence Making Lawyers a
Disappearing Profession?, FIN. REV. (Apr. 25, 2017, 12:38 AM),
http://www.afr.com/business/legal/is-artificial-intelligence-making-lawyers-adisappearing-profession-20170418-gvmzbs; Dan Mangan, Lawyers Could Be the
Next Profession to Be Replaced by Computers, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:33
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/17/lawyers-could-be-replaced-byartificial-intelligence.html.
3
RICHARD SUSSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF THE PROFESSIONS:
HOW TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HUMAN EXPERTS 154–55
(2015).
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charge high, sometimes extravagant, prices for their services. It has
also produced barriers to innovation. Clients have begun to react to
perceived consistent overcharging and inefficient services of the
BigLaw firms that benefit from the monopoly at the same time that
technologies are becoming more powerful and effective. Meanwhile,
new and hungry legal service providers who provide alternative
business models to law firms are also using new technologies to
open access to law and erode the monopoly. Lawyers are facing
increasing competition that is set to destroy the BigLaw firm model.
The disruption, though, will not be limited to BigLaw, and will also
impact smaller law firms and sole practitioners.
As the dynamic between clients and lawyers changes, the next
generation of lawyers will be required to perform a vast number of
roles to satisfy client demands while all the while being asked to
maintain their professional responsibilities. Lawyers, as humans,
will be incapable of, or disinterested in, managing the demands of
this multi-faceted role, and the professional aspect of the role will
further recede. However, computers have vast technical knowledge,
they do not seek financial reward, and they can be programmed to
work ceaselessly and to put the client’s interests ahead of their own.
It is computers, therefore, that will be in a much better position to
display “professional” characteristics than humans in the future. If
it is desirable to have a legal profession, then it is in the interests of
our society to allow computers to take the role of legal services
providers. It will be necessary to take the profession out of the hands
of self-interested humans and to develop a technological profession
that would provide legal services, initially with the assistance of
lawyers, but then, as with the introduction of autonomous vehicles,
in a five-staged deployment, develop a fully autonomous legal
profession. This new technological profession would also
subordinate “personal aims and ambitions to the service of . . . [the
law] discipline and the promotion of its function in the community”4
and begin to regain the trust so lacking in the legal profession today.

4

Daryl Dawson, The Legal Services Market, 5 J. JUD. ADM. 147, 148 (1996).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Law is a profession. It evolved from around the twelfth century
as individuals within the church developed expertise in canon law6
and, over time, developed the characteristics that many now use to
distinguish a profession: “special skill and learning; public service
as the principal goal; and autonomy or self-regulation.”7 However,
the legal profession, as dominated by large law firms, has more
recently drifted from its professional moorings and, in doing so, has
opened itself up for disruption.8 Some commentators have argued
that the disruption of the legal services industry could spell the death
of the profession.9 Susskind surmised that new technologies may
result in the end of lawyers.10 He posited that commoditization of
legal work and new technologies would combine to make the
traditional work of the lawyer redundant.11 This analysis oversimplifies Susskind’s prodigious output on the subject, but I agree
with his ultimate conclusion that technology will have a disruptive
effect on the legal services market. However, Susskind elides the
5

YSAIAH ROSS, ETHICS IN LAW: LAWYERS’ RESPONSIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AUSTRALIA 57 (5th ed. 2010).
6
James A. Brundage, The Rise of the Professional Jurist in the Thirteenth
Century, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 185, 186 (1994).
7
G. E. DAL PONT, LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5 (4th ed. 2010);
see ROSS, supra note 5, at 58–59.
8
Christensen, Raynor & McDonald, supra note 1, at 44. Christensen, et al.
define disruption as a process in which smaller, less-well-resourced companies
provide products and services that challenge larger incumbent companies. Id. The
smaller companies take advantage of the tendency of the larger incumbents to
concentrate resources on their most profitable clients. Id. This leaves the
disrupting companies free to provide the overlooked clients with “more-suitable
functionality—frequently at a lower price.” Id. Disruption is complete when the
smaller disruptive companies develop their products and services to a point where
mainstream customers adopt them in volume. Id.
9
See Robert F. Cochran Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death,
Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 308–11 (2000); Bob Murray, Will Law Firms Be
Digitised
to
Death?,
LAW.
WKLY.
(Oct.
6,
2016),
https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/opinion/19702-will-law-firms-be-digitizedto-death.
10
See generally RICHARD E. SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING
THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
11
Id. at 27.
5

MAR. 2019] Tech, BigLaw, and the Computer Professional

409

root cause of the disruption. I argue that there is a malignancy that
has metastasized in two of the ideals that define a profession (that
is, the requirements for special skill and learning, and self-regulation
and autonomy) that has led to the legal profession holding a
monopoly on providing legal services. This monopoly has led to big
law firms becoming businesses in pursuit of profits, rather than true
members of a profession. It is this business-oriented pursuit of
monopoly profits that has developed in place of a more professional
(in the traditional sense) approach to client service that has opened
the legal services market up to disruption.
Part II of this paper teases out the tenets of a profession and
emphasizes the professional ethics of service to society as a defining
characteristic. A profession sets the level of education required, and
the credentials that individuals must attain, to enter it.12 A profession
is typically also responsible for constantly testing the capabilities of
its members and for expelling those who fail to maintain the required
levels of competence and “character.”13 The legal profession
upholds these entry requirements with vigor. Ironically, though, by
enshrining these defining characteristics of professions the legal
profession has excluded others from performing “legal work” and
has thus created a monopoly on providing legal services.14
12

See, for example, regulation five of the Legal Profession Uniform Admission
Rules of New South Wales, which sets out the prerequisite academic
qualifications as:
successfully completing a tertiary academic course in Australia, whether
or not leading to a degree in law, which:
(a) includes the equivalent of at least 3 years’ full-time study of law,
(b) is accredited by the Board, and
(c) the Board determines will provide for a student to acquire and
demonstrate appropriate understanding and competence in each element
of the academic areas of knowledge set out in Schedule 1, or otherwise
determined by the Admissions Committee after consulting each of the
Boards.
Legal Profession Uniform Law 2015 (NSW) reg 5 (Austl.).
13
Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 543, 548–49 (2004).
14
See JOSEPH W BARTLETT, THE LAW BUSINESS: A TIRED MONOPOLY 7–19
(1982); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES,
AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 16–23 (1987); Bridgette Dunlap, Anyone
Can "Think Like a Lawyer": How the Lawyers’ Monopoly on Legal
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Part III examines the monopoly that lawyers hold over the
provision of legal services. It also addresses the damaging impact
that monopolies, in any industry, pose to prices and innovation. The
literature on monopolies, in general, is not kind;15 there are a number
of social and economic costs associated with them including that
monopolists charge higher prices and fail to innovate.16 Monopolies
also lead to a deadweight loss to society, which, in the case of the
lawyer monopoly, has led to problems with the majority of society
being able to access justice. The social and economic costs of
monopolies have been evident in the legal profession, mostly in big
law firms, for many years and have eroded the tenets that make law
a profession in the first place. In doing so, they have created fertile
ground for disruption.17 Susskind and Susskind acknowledged the
monopoly held by professions, including the legal profession, and
that the cost of legal services was a key driver in a technological
response to the monopoly.18 They argued that the commoditization
of legal work and technological innovation would erode the
monopoly and lead to the end of the profession.19 They reported the
monopoly merely as a fact of the modern legal profession. I argue
that it is the monopoly itself that has brought the legal profession to
the point at which it is now ripe for disruption. It is the monopoly,
Understanding Undermines Democracy and the Rule of Law in the United States,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2817, 2821–23 (2014); Leslie C. Levin, The Monopoly Myth
and Other Tales about the Superiority of Lawyers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611,
2611 (2013).
15
See, e.g., MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
43–57 (2004).
16
See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. ECON. 807, 807–27 (1975); MOTTA, supra note 15.
17
Here, I must distinguish between the big law firms that act as businesses from
the large number of hard-working lawyers, such as dedicated local sole
practitioners, or those in community legal centers or indigenous legal services, or
even hardworking, honest lawyers within the large law firms whose work does
contribute to the greater good of society. In Part IV, I make the argument that for
these large law firms, law has become a business rather than a profession.
However, in my experience, I know of several lawyers within large law firms that
maintain high ideals and professionalism despite the corrosive effect of the
business imperatives of Big Law.
18
SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 27, 67–68.
19
Id. at 67–68.
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and all that comes with it that has caused the underlying
environment that feeds the disruption. Concentrating blame on the
technology misses the point; it blames the tool used to disrupt rather
than its root cause. New technology alone does not disrupt an
industry. Disruption is a reaction to, for example, client
dissatisfaction. That dissatisfaction stems in large part from
overpricing, failures to innovate and the deadweight loss to
society—natural outcomes of monopolies. NewLaw,20 using new
technologies, is disrupting traditional models of providing legal
services. However, the new technology is merely the tool that is
enabling new solutions. It is the means by which the disruptive
forces can have their way.
In Part IV, I argue that, because the legal profession has been
able to maintain a monopoly on providing legal services, law has
become a business that has drifted from its professional moorings. I
discuss how BigLaw21 has for many years maintained its business
model which relies on leveraging large numbers of junior lawyers
20
Eric Chin, 2018: The Year Axiom Becomes the World’s Largest Legal
Services
Firm,
BEATON
CAP.
(Sept.
13,
2013),
http://www.beatoncapital.com/2013/09/2018-year-axiom-becomes-worldslargest-legal-services-firm/ (defining the term “NewLaw”). For a definition of
“NewLaw,” see infra Part V.C.1
21
The traits of BigLaw are (or have been described as):
• Attraction and training of top legal talent,
• ‘Leveraging’ of these full-time lawyers to do the bulk of the work
serving clients,
• Creation of a tournament to motivate the lawyers to strive to
become equity partners (the idea of a tournament is akin to Roman
gladiator contests and the subject of a seminal book),
• Tight restriction on the number of equity owners,
• Structuring as a partnership, and
• Charging high hourly rates (which is or at least until very recently
has been possible because of the mystique associated with legal
advice).
George Beaton, Last Days of the BigLaw Business Model?, BEATON CAP. (Sept.
6, 2013), http://www.beatoncapital.com/2013/09/last-days-biglaw-businessmodel/. Perhaps one day soon we will witness the Amazon of law—a single law
firm that will provide advice to all of the world’s largest companies. Conflicts of
interest may prevent one single large law firm of this nature, but if there are only
two or three such firms remaining, then all of the world’s corporate work can be
divided among these firms.
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working long hours to push profits up to the partner level.
Technology threatens to make much of that level of lawyers
redundant. Law firms, whose profit model depends on leveraging,
will seek to resist the disruption but its impact is insistent, and the
barriers that define the lawyers’ monopoly are falling. The pressures
I outline in Part V of this paper are leading to some interesting
outcomes. BigLaw is reacting to these pressures and is trying to
stave off its demise by adopting new technologies. This creates a
feedback loop in which the BigLaw firms adopt and beta test new
technology which leads to better, faster, and more intrusive
technology being able to do more of the work currently performed
by lawyers. Ironically, it is only the BigLaw firms that have the
scale, large data sets, and financial strength to be able to test some
of these new technologies and allow them to “learn” and improve
their capabilities. By buying into this process, so they can be seen
adopting new technology, the large law firms may be hastening their
own disruption.22 Unfortunately for the rest of the legal profession,
once the beta testing is completed and prices for new technologies
reduce because of economies of scale built over time, new
technologies will eventually drop onto the rest of the legal service
industry with catastrophic effect.
Despite the emphasis in the literature on technology being the
disrupting force, there are other forces that have allowed technology
to become a disruptive tool in the first place. In Part V, I argue that
there are five distinct forces creating pressure on law firms—the

22

For example, The Law Society of New South Wales noted that:
Large law firms accustomed to operating in traditional ways are hedging
their bets by forging alliances with start-ups. Last year, the Australian
office of Norton Rose Fulbright increased its financial stake in
Australia’s LawPath, a company that supplies low-cost documents
online and connects clients to lawyers for fixed-price work. Also in
2016, Gilbert + Tobin increased its stake in Australian technologyenabled legal practice LegalVision by close to 20 per cent, from
$600,000. Allens has developed its own suite of fully downloadable, free
documents for the start-up market and has reported 3,000 unique
downloads as of July 2016.
THE L. SOC’Y OF NSW, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND INNOVATION IN THE
PROFESSION 31 (Gary Ulman et al. eds., 2017).
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archetypal model for providing legal services23—that are creating
fertile ground for disruptive innovation in the legal services market.
The first pressure is created because legal services have been
overpriced for a long time. The predominant structure of the modern
legal practice—the partnership within a monopoly—has allowed
lawyers to charge clients by the hour in increments of six minutes,
which has, over time, driven up prices for fundamentally inefficient
practices.24 I argue that this overcharging by law firms is the biggest
determinant of disruption to the profession. Overcharging, and a
lack of innovative service, another outcome of monopolies, seems
to have reached its apogee sometime in the last ten to twenty years
and clients have begun to push back. Clients are now pressuring law
firms to reduce fees and to use fee models other than the billable
hour.25 Before the interruption of new technologies, law firms have
been able to resist these client demands. Now, other pressures are
combining with client pressure to lessen that resistance.
The second pressure on the traditional or incumbent legal
service providers is that, for a number of years, there has been a
consistent oversupply of lawyers into the market.26 This has led to
two outcomes: firstly, those law graduates who left legal practice or

23

The structure of the legal services market with law firms as the dominant
force is outlined infra Part IV.
24
See Tim Williams, Busy Fools vs. Eureka Moments, IGNITION CONSULTING
GROUP (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.ignitiongroup.com/propulsion-blog/payingfor-busy-fools-or-eureka-moments.
25
David Ruiz, Microsoft Rethinks Law Firm Relationships as 13 Join
Alternative Billing and Diversity Initiative, LEGAL WK. (Aug. 8, 2017),
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2017/08/08/microsoft-rethinks-lawfirm-relationships-as-13-firms-join-alternative-billing-and-diversity-push/.
26
Christine Parker, An Oversupply of Law Graduates? Putting the Statistics in
Context, 4 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 255, 255 (1993). Parker refuted the claims of
oversupply in this 1993 article. See generally id. However, since 1993, the number
of law schools in Australia has doubled and, as a result, the number of law
graduates has concomitantly increased. See Peter Woelert & Gwilym Croucher,
The Multiple Dynamics of Isomorphic Change: Australian Law Schools 1987–
1996, 56 MINERVA 479, 491–92 (2018); see also David Weisbrot, What Lawyers
Need to Know What Lawyers Need to Be Able to Do: An Australian Experience,
1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 21, 29 (2002) (“[L]awyer numbers have
continued to grow, leading to greater intra-professional competition.”).
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chose in the first place not to become practicing lawyers27 have
added to a society that is better educated in the law and legal
matters,28 and this more educated population has continued to
demystify the law and dilute the monopoly in legal knowledge
traditionally held by law firms.
Secondly, and relatedly, this oversupply of lawyers that are
leaving law firms creates a third pressure on the big law firm service
model. The diaspora of lawyers has created an explosion of legal
service providers able to offer easier access to law at a much lower
cost than the traditional law firm partnership and has spawned a new
term: “NewLaw.”29 These NewLaw providers create alternative
models of providing legal services to the longstanding structure of
the law firm partnership. They are also able to compete with law
firms by harnessing the recent exponential increase in the power,
availability, and utility of new technology, including technology that
is specifically designed to do the work of lawyers.30 In effect, they
have been given a loaded gun. These new entrants to the market (the
disruptors) are finding ways to provide innovative and cost effective
legal services outside the traditional law firm partnership model.31
Consequently, the traditional clients of law firms, such as in-house
27

Nicola Berkovic, Fewer Law Graduates Are Choosing Practice as a Career,
AUSTRALIAN (July 1, 2011), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legalaffairs/fewer-law-graduates-are-choosing-practice-as-a-career/newsstory/03552d1a9a5f1c85dd15f1145e2e208d?sv=95a9d2c40ca3d9327d8681cb14
fbaade (noting that “the proportion of law graduates taking jobs in industry or
commerce jumped from 13.5 per cent to 20.1 per cent” between 2005 and 2010).
28
These are what Furlong refers to as “self-navigators.” See Jordan Furlong,
The Pivot Generation: How Tomorrow’s Lawyers Will Help Build a New and
Better Legal Market, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 428 (2017).
29
See Chin, supra note 20 (coining the term “NewLaw”).
30
For example, see Ailira, which is marketed as:
an artificial intelligence that uses natural language processing to provide
free legal information on a broad range of legal issues, including
Business Structuring, Wills and Estate Planning and much more coming
soon! In addition, you can use Ailira to instantly generate Australian
legal documents for your business and personal use, much cheaper and
faster than a visit to a lawyer would take.
AILIRA, https://www.ailira.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
31
See, e.g., NEXUS LAW GROUP, https://www.nexuslawyers.com.au/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2019).
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legal counsel, who are subject to their own cost pressures, are now
more willing to acquire their legal services from this greater range
of providers.32
The fourth force pressuring traditional models of providing legal
services (although in combination with the other three) is the new
technology itself. Over the last 30 years, there have been exponential
advances in computer technology, including in the sub-categories of
artificial intelligence: machine learning, natural language
processing, and computer vision.33 Savvy legal entrepreneurs are
able to use these new technologies to help clients unlock access to
law that has been for so long under the control of lawyers and law
firms. Some of the first applications of new technologies in law
include expertise automation systems designed specifically to
systematize routine tasks, such as common advices, previously
performed by lawyers.34 Other applications target document review,
legal research, and case prediction.
Further, because of improvements in technology, the primary
sources of the law are much more freely available on the internet
and are constantly updated.35 This development, related and
dependent on improvements in technology, is the fifth element that
is pressuring the business model of BigLaw. It is democratizing
legal knowledge that for so long has been in the sole keep of
lawyers. The combination of powerful computer technology and
free access to law is allowing not only law firms but also NewLaw
entrepreneurs to provide legal services quicker and cheaper than
ever before.36 Free access to law also allows sophisticated business
32

See MAHLAB, MAHLAB REPORT 2016: CORPORATE 4 (2016)
https://docplayer.net/40663725-Mahlab-report-2016-corporate-corporatelawyers-company-secretaries.html.
33
This exponential trajectory seems to have flattened in the last few years. See
The End of Moore’s Law, RODNEY BROOKS (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://rodneybrooks.com/the-end-of-moores-law/. However, this has not slowed
the onslaught of new technology from NewLaw providers and developers of new
technology aimed squarely at the law firm monopoly.
34
See, e.g., NEOTA LOGIC, https://www.neotalogic.com/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2019) (advertising drag and drop software products).
35
See infra Part V.E (referencing the Austlii effect).
36
Governments have seen the need to legislate to combat overcharging and
inefficiency. For example, the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005
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people to access and understand their legal rights without having to
refer to law firms.
The disruption of the BigLaw services model will have an
impact on the way that legal services are provided in the future, but
it is difficult to predict what that market will look like in, say, twenty
years’ time.37 Part VI discusses some of the impacts of these changes
on the legal profession already and provides some predictions about
what changes need to be made to prepare new lawyers for a
profession in flux. It is the nature of disruption that change happens
quickly. One thing is certain—the way that legal services are
delivered in the near future will be a far cry from the rigid way that
the profession has carried on business over the last 200 or so years.
Despite this, these changes in the profession do not have to be a bad
thing. In many ways, by facilitating greater service and freer access
to law at a lower cost, new technology could pre-empt a new
profession. In the new profession, lawyers will be required to
embrace new technologies or perish. Disruption has a tendency to
subvert the status quo, no matter the intentions of the incumbent.
Furlong predicted some radical changes in the work that lawyers
will be required to perform in the future, all the while displaying the
characteristics of a professional. I argue that computers are much
more suited to this new environment and could potentially provide
a much more professional service than humans. The goals of
providing a public service is an important defining characteristic of

(NSW) and the rules of the court stated in section 56 to be the “just, quick and
cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings” as opposed to a drawn out
and expensive resolution. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 56 (Austl.).
37
See, e.g., Furlong, supra note 28, at 416 (“The legal market is transforming,
and it is not at all clear what the result of that transformation will be.”); My Dated
Predictions, RODNEY BROOKS (Jan. 1, 2018), https://rodneybrooks.com/mydated-predictions/ (providing predictions on the probability of certain events
occurring within the next thirty-two years); see also PETER STONE ET AL.,
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND
LIFE
IN
2030
(2016),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report (exposing the practical limitations on
seeking to predict impacts of developing AI in the next 15 years in eight key
domains: transportation, healthcare, education, public safety and security,
employment, workforce, and entertainment).
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a profession38 that sets it apart from a trade or an occupation. The
legal profession, as dominated by large law firms, has strayed from
this ideal; but, with the intervention of new technology, it might be
able to regain some of its fundamental character.
Part VII concludes with a note of optimism for the rebirth of law
as a profession—only with computers at the helm. After all, as with
taxi drivers and truck drivers, themselves subject to disruption
through technology, not many in society will mourn the loss of the
lawyer. I argue that, far from being the death of the profession,
technology should allow more people to gain greater access to the
law at a lower cost. Surely, this is laudable as an aim of society; that
its citizens should have free, or at least affordable, access to the laws
that govern them and not be beholden to those members of a
monopoly privileged enough to define and control that access. There
will still be a need for lawyers with their expertise in the law to guide
development of new laws and to lead members of society through
the intricacies of interpreting and applying the law. Therefore, the
advent of new technologies that can perform many tasks currently
performed by lawyers may bring, not the decline of a profession, but
its rebirth and the opportunity for lawyers to become true
professionals again.
II. LAW AS A PROFESSION
Examining the tenets of a profession highlights firstly how far
the legal profession, as epitomized by BigLaw firms, has strayed
from the core tenets of professionalism and, secondly, to light a clear
path back. In Parts III and IV, I demonstrate how far from the path
of professionalism the legal services industry has strayed. In the
latter half of the paper, I highlight the positives that might be taken
from the current disruption of the industry that might signal the
rebirth of the profession—albeit a technologically enhanced version.
Firstly, though, I attempt to clarify what a profession, and in
particular, what the legal profession is (or could be).

38

Although it is difficult to use a set of traits to define professionalism, this
characteristic is predominant in many descriptions of professions and is discussed
more fully in Part II of the paper.
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There is no settled definition of a profession, but there are a
number of attributes or traits that have been used to mark out a
profession. These include:
• skill based on theoretical knowledge;
• the provision of training and education;
• testing the competence of members;
• an ethical code of conduct; and
• altruistic service.39
But these traits now describe a number of occupations other than
the traditional professions such as medicine, law, and the clergy and
as such, their use in distinguishing professions from other
occupations has lessened.40 Rizzardi, former attorney for the
Department of Justice and member of the Florida Bar’s ethics and
professionalism committees, analogized Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart’s reference to classifying pornography, “I know it
when I see it,”41 to help define professionalism. The obverse might
also be true: we know it when we do not see it; that is, when socalled professionals or professions no longer seem to act
professionally.42
There is a considerable body of literature that espouses the
altruistic ideals of the legal profession. Lawyer professionalism has
been described as “high competency in the knowledge and skills
necessary for professional work, respect for the justice system and
its participants, and ‘civic trusteeship’ or an attitude of ‘public
altruism’ by every lawyer toward the justice system.”43 In 1953,
Roscoe Pound, former Dean of Harvard Law School, defined a
profession as:
a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service - no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
39

See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 5, at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
41
Keith W. Rizzardi, Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, FLA.
B.J., July–Aug. 2005, at 38.
42
SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33–37.
43
John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into
Legal Education: Strengthening the Professionalism of Law Students, 39 U. TOL.
L. REV. 323, 331 (2008).
40
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means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public
service is the primary purpose.44

Chief Judge Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, in 1974,
differentiated the legal profession from a business and emphasized
a professional’s “duty to subordinate financial reward to social
responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even in
nonprofessional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a
learned, disciplined, and honorable occupation.”45
In 1986, the Stanley Report, reporting on falling levels of legal
professionalism (or rather, the lack of it demonstrated in the legal
profession at that time) settled on the following, more prosaic and
aspirational definition of the legal profession:
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following assumptions:
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use
of complex judgments;
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the
service, they must trust those they consult;
3. That the client’s trust presupposes that the practitioner’s self-interest
is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client’s interest and the
public good; and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating—that is, organized in such a
way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are competent,
do not violate their client’s trust, and transcend their own self-interest.46

By the late 1980s then, descriptions of the legal profession that
included notions of altruism and a common calling to pursue a
learned art, tended to do so longingly, more in hope, than as a
description of the profession as it had become. In 1992, Terrell and
Wildman opined that the legal profession had an obligation to “help
the legal system remain the centerpiece of our fragile sense of
community, [and] help it continue to function within our culture as
JUSTIN A. STANLEY, ET AL., COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, A.B.A., “. . . . IN
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/mi
44

grated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/stanley_commission_report.pdf
[hereinafter Stanley Report] (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM
ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).
45
In the Matter of Freeman, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483 (N.Y. 1974).
46
STANLEY, ET AL., BLUEPRINT, supra note 44, at 10.
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the crucial mechanism for social cohesion and stability;”47 the
implication being that social cohesion and a sense of community
was, indeed, fragile and soon to be lost. However, as I discuss in
Part VI, this is the very role that computers can fill as they develop.
By 1996, there was a marked shift in the directness of remarks
by the judiciary about the lack of these characteristics in the
professionalism of the legal community. In that year, Justice
Michael Kirby, then of the High Court of Australia, challenged the
legal profession to “re-evaluate its conduct with a view to enhancing
the level of service provided to a community which has everincreasing expectations of the profession but a diminishing
estimation of the likelihood that such expectations will be
fulfilled.”48
The idea that legal professionals would “subordinate financial
reward” to the greater good of society were completely missing from
these later descriptions of lawyer professionalism and seem to have
been abandoned sometime after the 1970s. Computers do not need
or pursue financial reward. So, while this characteristic of
professionalism may have fallen off the list for human lawyers, it is
still attainable by computers.
In 1996, former Justice of the High Court of Australia, Sir Daryl
Dawson, described this loss by comparing the traditional notion of
a professional to the modern day exemplar:
Traditionally the aim of a profession was to promote the purpose for
which it existed. The primary aim of a professional man or woman was
not to make money but to provide, for example, good health care or good
legal services. To be sure, the professional practitioner generally made a
good living . . . . But it was the subordination of personal aims and
ambitions to the service of a particular discipline and the promotion of
its function in the community which marked out a profession. A member
47

Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41
EMORY L.J. 403, 423 (1992). This approach to lawyer professionalism that
emphasizes a greater duty to society as a primary trait is not without its detractors.
See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 317–21 (1995) (discussing a range of lawyer types
that challenge the one true professional lawyer stereotype proposed by the
“professionalism crusade”).
48
Michael Kirby, Billable Hours in a Noble Calling?, 21 ALTERNATIVE L.J.
257, 257 (1996).
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of a profession was an educated person whose knowledge was acquired,
not for the purpose of sale, but on trust for the benefit of the profession
itself and the community which it serves. That is to say, professional
practice involved the use by practitioners of the knowledge which they
acquired through their education, not in the conduct of an enterprise
intent on acquiring the largest market share and making the most profits,
but as individuals serving their clients and, through them, the
community.49

Sir Daryl then differentiated what he referred to as “social
trustee professionalism” and “expert professionalism;” the former
exhibiting the service aspects outlined in the quote above while the
latter was “concerned with the marketing of expertise rather than
with the use of knowledge in the service of the client or the
community.”50 Expert professionalism—that is, monetizing legal
knowledge—Sir Daryl said, more closely described the modern day
legal profession. Similarly, Halliday argued that there is a spectrum
of behaviors that fit within the definition of professional: one set of
behaviors that is “monopolistic, even narcissistic, and the other
benign, even altruistic.”51 Both commentators seem to reluctantly
accept the bad behavior (either economic or narcissistic) as now
being a characteristic of a profession. There seems to be some
acceptance that these aberrant behaviors now fit within a definition
of a modern legal profession.
It is unclear whether this seeming acceptance by Dawson and
Halliday of a more economic or narcissistic bent in legal
professionals reflected a shift in the societal attitudes towards the
norms that underpinned the legal profession. Whatever level of
acceptance there was, or has been in the last twenty years, it is
apparent that from around the mid-1990s, the notions of lawyer
professionalism were changing to reflect more mercenary-like
characteristics.52 The modern practice of law, especially under the
auspices of BigLaw firms, has strayed from its professional roots.
Susskind and Susskind noted that this behavior is similar across all
49

Dawson, supra note 4, at 148.
Id.
51
HALLIDAY, supra note 14, at 3.
52
Modern day references to sports people (e.g., professional footballers) also
may tend to conflate the notions of a true profession to professionals who play
sport (in this example) for large sums of money.
50
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professions.53 They argued that professions have become
unaffordable, have become antiquated, restrict access to their
knowledge, underperform, and are inscrutable.54 This is certainly
true of the legal profession.
We must not lose sight of the fact that the notion that a
profession provides a service to society has been, and remains, a
prominent feature in many discussions about professions. This is a
consistent trait (for want of a better term) of professions. Lawyers
take pride in being labelled professionals because the label comes
with such privileges as status, respect, and being able to selfregulate. A profession that accepts the prestige associated with its
professional status should not accept those benefits without meeting
its concomitant obligations of maintaining the ideals of
professionalism in practice. If it loses what distinguishes it as a
profession, then it is in danger of losing the benefits of a profession.
In the next two Parts of this paper, I illustrate how far the law
business has strayed from its professional roots and how it has
become a business. I argue that this failure of the legal profession is
in large part because of a mutation in other precepts of a profession;
namely its ability to self-regulate, and to set its own entry
requirements. These constructs have enabled lawyers to establish a
monopoly (with all that entails) over the provision of legal services.
Part III examines the way the monopoly has been established and
how it operates. Part IV details the depths to which law has become
a business. Part V details the pressures that are being exerted on and
disrupting the legal services business, and Part VI sets out what the
effects of this disruption might have on the legal services industry.
III. LAWYERS HAVE A MONOPOLY ON LEGAL SERVICES
This Part outlines the monopoly that lawyers have in providing
legal services in Part III.A. It then discusses some purported benefits
of monopolies in Part III.B and some of the known detriments of
monopolies in III.C.

53
54

SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 36.
Id. at 33–37.
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A. The Lawyer Monopoly
The notion that the legal profession holds a monopoly on
providing legal services is well established.55 I discuss it here for
several reasons: first, to highlight the problems that can arise
because of the protections that a profession affords; second, to
discuss the problems inherent in monopolies that have become
obvious in the legal services industry; and, third, as a lead into the
discussion about law becoming a business in Part IV. I argue that
this monopoly, enabled by the structures put in place to protect the
profession, has mutated the profession and has allowed lawyers to
turn the profession into a business.
The monopoly that the legal profession holds over the provision
of legal services derives from the very fact that law is a profession.
As discussed in Part II, professions are self-regulated. Crain, who at
the time the article was written was Professor of Law at the
University of North Carolina, argued that this “[a]uthority to selfregulate is founded upon the esoteric character of professional
knowledge, which in turn makes it difficult for the public to assess
performance or for the government to regulate it.”56 The legal
profession is self-regulating for these very reasons. Law is esoteric;
lawyers argue that only they could possibly understand its
complexity and intricacies enough to regulate it.57 The structure of a
profession as an autonomous self-regulating entity that sets its own
entry requirements inherently leads to its members holding a
monopoly on providing professional services.58 Looked at another
55

See sources cited supra note 14.
Crain, supra note 13, at 548–49. Additionally, Part V of this article discusses
how new technologies are surpassing human knowledge and performance in legal
domains and that this element of a profession should no longer be a reason for
lawyers to maintain a self-regulating profession.
57
Eliot Freidson, Theory and the Professions, 64 IND. L.J. 423, 427 (1989). In
Australia, the monopoly is affirmed in the various pieces of legislation regulating
legal practice. See, e.g., Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) ss 5, 10, 43
(Austl.) (prohibiting an entity from engaging in legal practice unless it is legal
practitioner or law practice authorized under the Uniform Law).
58
See BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 7; see also DAL PONT, supra note 7, at 7.
This is not a monopoly in that there is only one company providing goods or
services in a market, but a broader conception of a monopoly over the provision
of legal services. Nevertheless, it is still possible to extrapolate from the theories
56
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way, these controls also form barriers to entry to the profession.59
The legal profession has created this monopoly for its services and
has maintained it since around the fifteenth century.60 Bartlett argued
that “the law business is a monopoly in the sense that competitive
access is limited by artificial entry barriers and its practitioners,
enjoying monopoly profits, suffer from the monopolist’s destructive
self-satisfaction . . . .”61 Crain argued that the monopoly created by
self-regulating professions such as law extended to “an economic
monopoly over recruitment, training, and credentialing, a political
monopoly over areas of expertise, and an administrative monopoly
over determining what standards shall apply to practitioners.”62
Lawyers have deliberately asserted and maintained this
monopoly over access to the law. As a small example, until recently
lawyers fostered a shibboleth in the use of Latin to restrict access to
legal knowledge. McLeod noted that the use of Latin in law was
“also a symbol of a profession. Latin adds to the mystery of the law.
It adds to the difficulty in accessing the law. It keeps the profession
separate from other parts of society, perhaps more now than it ever
did.”63 Perhaps because of this, proponents of plain English in law
have for some time now advocated to reject Latinisms for the very
reason that it excludes those external to the legal monopoly from
accessing the law.64
B. Benefits of Monopolies
Some commentators argue that monopolies, in general sense,
can increase economic efficiency. For example, Barzel argued that,
of monopolies in relation to monopoly pricing and failure to innovate. See infra
Part V.
59
BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 16.
60
ROSS, supra note 5, at 58.
61
BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 7.
62
Crain, supra note 13, at 548–49.
63
Peter R. Macleod, Latin in Legal Writing: An Inquiry into the Use of Latin in
the Modern Legal World, 39 B.C. L. REV. 235, 250 (1997) (citing LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 263 (1975)).
64
See Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Writing—A Lawyer’s Professional
Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 506 (1999). Perhaps the plain English
movement might be seen as the first technology aimed at undermining the
monopoly.
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at the commodity level, monopolies can lead to increased output and
lower prices.65 To use the example of a law firm, the full resources
of the firm could be used to produce the monopolist product—say,
some expertise in the law as it applies to a particular industry.66
Another, less convincing, argument in favor of monopolies is that a
monopoly can be used to avoid “the resource waste involved in
competition among innovators.”67
Some of the reasons proffered for maintaining the monopoly that
the legal profession holds over the provision of legal services
include that it ensures confidence in the rule of law, quality of
service, and “professionalism.”68 Other arguments put forward
include that it preserves the separation of powers and the rights of
citizens in a democracy.69 Lawyers have fostered this monopoly, and
lawyers guard it. This has led to criticisms of conflicts of interest—
criticisms that are routinely rejected by the profession.70 However,
the problems associated with the monopoly over legal services run
deeper than conflicts of interest.
C. Problems Associated with Monopolies
While the arguments above can be made in favor of monopolies,
much more has been written, and laws have been enacted,71 because
of the detrimental effects of monopolies. Susskind and Susskind
65

Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348,
354 (1968).
66
BARTLETT, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that expertise in Wall Street firms that
consistently deal with the Securities Exchange Commission, and stating that “[i]t
is impossible for most lawyers to acquire the sensitivity to securities regulation
problems that a partner in a large Wall Street firm has at his fingertips.”).
67
Barzel, supra note 65, at 354.
68
See Montgomery, supra note 43, at 331 (citing A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992)).
69
But see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 854–55 (1992) (dismissing these arguments as supporting lawyer
independence).
70
See, e.g., Christine Parker, Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal
Practice: Autonomy and Responsiveness, 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 676, 693 (2002)
(“[T]he mainly self-regulatory nature of complaints investigation maintains the
conflict between the legal professional association as ‘union’ and investigatorprosecutor for its own members.”).
71
See, e.g., Competition and Consumer Act 2010, c 4 (Austl.).
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touched on the problems associated with monopolies held by
professions including the legal profession and decried the view that
“many professional services are inefficient, too costly, and have yet
to be subject to the overhaul that the great majority of other
industries have endured.”72 They did not directly draw the
connection between the structures inherent in a profession as the
cause of the monopoly in the first place. Neither did they deal
directly with the problems in the literature that monopolies cause,
just their ultimate effect.73 It is therefore helpful to briefly touch on
some monopoly theory to explain the impact that monopolies have
had on the legal services market.
Apart from the misallocation of resources that they cause,74 there
are two other major problems with monopolies. First, they allow the
monopolist to charge monopoly prices to extract a super profit. In
law, there are constant reminders of this overcharging by lawyers.75
It has been subject to almost universal criticism76 but this has largely
72

SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 34.
Id.
74
See, for example, the comments by Justice Finkelstein about the
misallocation of resources caused by monopolies in Application by Chime
Communications Pty Ltd [No.2] (2009) ACompT 2 (Austl.).
75
See, e.g., Fiona Hudson, Lawyer Banned Until 2020 for Excessively
Overcharging
Clients,
HERALD
SUN
(June
1,
2014),
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/lawyer-banned-until-2020-forexcessively-overcharging-clients/newsstory/3ebca0807a94b231b6b5aad4155284e5 (citing instances of overcharging by
lawyers); Richard Ackland, Small Cases, Big Bills: Keddies Working Overtime to
Kill Complaints, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/small-cases-big-billskeddies-working-overtime-to-kill-complaints-20111117-1nl5m.html (providing
details concerning a multi-million dollar lawsuit against an Australian law firm
on grounds the firm overcharged clients); Gino Dal Pont, Charging for Access to
Justice, VICTORIAN L. INST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.liv.asn.au/StayingInformed/LIJ/LIJ/September-2017/Charging-For-Access-To-Justice
(“Overcharging damages the reputation of the legal profession.”).
76
In Simic v Norton [2017] 1007 FamCA 3 (Austl.), his honor, addressing costs
up front, said “the consequences of obscenely high legal costs are destructive of
the emotional, social and financial wellbeing of the parties and their children. It
must stop.” Id.; see also Steve Mark, Billing Complaints—Are You
Overcharging?, Presentation to the Best Billing Practice Legalwise Seminar,
Sydney (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/billing_compl
73
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not changed the billing practices that foster the overcharging in the
first place.77 Second, monopolies cause a deadweight loss to
society;78 that is, the amount of product or service that could be
provided at a lower price that the monopolist does not produce, and
is not then available to the consumer who cannot afford the
monopoly price for the service. In law firms, we see this as the legal
services that would ordinarily be provided or consumed by society
but that, because the price is too high, is not consumed by
anybody—particularly those who can least afford it.79 This has
caused an enormous problem that is characterized as a problem of
access to justice, but it can also be characterized as a deadweight
loss caused by the lawyer monopoly.
Thirdly, there is no incentive for the monopolist to innovate to
provide a better or more cost effective service. Indeed, Sheremata,
aints_are_you_overcharging.pdf (“[C]osts continue to be the most complained
about issue at the OLSC. In 2006 – 2007, costs complaints comprised of 24% of
all the written complaints we received. Of these complaints overcharging
continues to be the most complained about issue in relation to costs (9.1%). This
has been the case for many years now.”).
77
I discuss the billing practices of the vast majority of law firms in Part IV. In
discussions about billing practices while I was in practice, a common refrain was
that “it is hard to argue against the business model of a person who makes $1
million a year.”
78
See Posner, supra note 16, at 807.
79
This deadweight loss leads to a problem in that people cannot afford to obtain
legal services. In 2016, the American Bar Association found that:
1. Most people living in poverty, and the majority of moderateincome individuals, do not receive the legal help they need . . . .
2. The public often does not obtain effective assistance with legal
problems, either because of insufficient financial resources or a
lack of knowledge about when legal problems exist that require
resolution through legal representation . . . .
3. The vast number of unrepresented parties in court adversely
impacts all litigants, including those who have representation.
4. Many lawyers, especially recent law graduates, are unemployed
or underemployed despite the significant unmet need for legal
services . . . .
A.B.A., REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 11–
16 (2016) [hereinafter
FUTURE
OF
LEGAL
SERVICES
REPORT], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016F
LSReport_FNL_WEB.pdf.
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Associate Professor of Policy at York University in Canada, argued
that “[m]onopolistic market structure[s] interact with network
externalities to produce barriers to innovation.”80 The American Bar
Association Legal Futures Report noted that:
The billable hour model, which enables lawyers to earn more money if
they spend more time on a matter, arguably provides less of an incentive
to develop more efficient delivery methods than other ways to charge for
services (for example, flat fees). This model also does not easily allow
for innovations in scalability, branding, marketing, and technology that
are found in most industries.81

The billing practices of law firms provide a good example of
both a monopolist charging monopoly prices, and of the failure of
monopolists to innovate. Nearly all law firms charge clients for the
time that they spend on their matters in six minute increments.82 This
has led to malaise in the legal profession that Susskind and Susskind
recognized in all professions;83 that “in most situations in which
professional help is called for, what is made available may be
adequate, good, or even great, but rarely is it world-class.”84 Despite
this, the lawyers’ monopoly over providing legal services has led
directly to the profession becoming a business. It is worthwhile to
reiterate the irony that the traits, or tenets, that mark out law as a
profession that were spelled out in Part II have led directly to
lawyers holding a monopoly. This has, in turn, led to law becoming
a business with all of the problems that entail, as set out in Part IV.
In a further irony, this business is incapable of displaying the ideals
of a profession set out in Part II.
IV. LAW AS A BUSINESS
This Part outlines how the structures through which law is
practiced have evolved to exacerbate the push for profit. In Part
IV.A, I argue that the partnership model itself promotes internal
80

Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to Innovation: A Monopoly, Network
Externalities, and the Speed of Innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 972 (1997)
(emphasis added).
81
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 79, at 16.
82
Kirby, supra note 48, at 258–59. In this way, firms are able to capture even
the most inconsequential work.
83
SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33–37.
84
Id. at 36.
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competition for greater profits. In Part IV.B, I describe how the push
by law firm partners for greater profits has increased since around
the 1950s. In Part IV.C, I show how this desire for profit has
changed the practice of law from a profession to a business, and in
Part IV.D, I give the example of incorporated legal practices as the
epitome of this change.
A. The Partnership Structure
Whatever view one takes about the merits of the practice of law
becoming a business, it clearly has done so.85 As discussed in Part
III, there has been no incentive for the monopolist law firms to
decrease prices, to innovate, or to improve service to their
customers. An example of the sameness of the provision of legal
services is the model through which lawyers have chosen to provide
their services—the partnership.86 The structure adopted by most law
firm partnerships can be viewed as a pyramid: there are a limited
number of partners at the top of the pyramid who control the
business, and, underneath these partners are employed lawyers of
varying experience and expertise who are encouraged to clamor for
partnership by meeting billing targets. George Beaton noted that
early in the 20th Century, Paul Cravath of Cravath, Swaine & Moore
LLP invented the “foundation for the contemporary BigLaw
business model.”87 That is, the structure of partners operating a

85

Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law
Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 466 (2008).
86
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the number of lawyers employed by
partnerships).
87
See Beaton, supra note 21. This is sometimes referred to as the Cravath model
after the system developed in the early part of the 20th Century by Paul Cravath
of Cravath, Swaine and Moore LLP. The firm’s website states that:
In the early twentieth century, when Paul Cravath was a young lawyer,
the structure of American law firms was quite different from today’s.
Associates were often trained as apprentices to another solo practitioner,
and made a living based on the clients that they could bring into their
practice. Paul Cravath recognized the inefficiency and shortcomings
inherent in that prevailing law firm structure and decided he wanted to
change it.
The
System’s
History,
CRAVATH,
SWAINE
&
MOORE
LLP,
https://www.cravath.com/systemshistory/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
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partnership model where associates work to become partners from
within the firm in a competitive environment.
Because lawyers have a monopoly on legal services and clients
must use lawyers for legal advice, law firms have been able to
charge monopoly prices for their services. Partners in a law firm take
a share of the profit generated (the amount of revenue minus costs).
This drives all the activities of the firm toward creating maximum
profit to share between the partners. In a partnership, there is no
requirement to distribute profits other than to the partners—such as
to investors for example—and all profits can be distributed at the
partners’ choosing. That is, the partners can choose to divert all of
the profits to themselves and not to reinvest into the business.
Profit can be increased in a number of ways, for example, by
increasing the amount charged for the service or by reducing the
costs incurred to provide that service. However, the typically small
group of partners at the top of the partnership pyramid cannot create
maximum profit by themselves. Profit at the top of the pyramid is
created by “leveraging”88 the amount charged out by those below
them on the pyramid. Therefore, legal practice has become a game
of mathematics where revenue equals the number of fee earners
multiplied by hours billed per day, multiplied by the charge out rate,
multiplied by the number of days in the year. Generally, increasing
any one of these components increases the size of profit (depending
on cost increases). It is not possible to increase the number of days
in a year, so to increase profit, partners must increase either (or both)
charge out rates or hours billed.89 In that way, increasing the
leverage, by increasing the number of junior lawyers and their
88

Sean Larkan, Low Leverage: A Low Road to Ruin for Law Firms?, 6 EDGE
INT’L REV., no. 2, 2011, at 21, 21 (2011), https://www.legalleadersblog.com/
files/2011/10/Edge-International-Review-October-2011-Low-leverage-lowroad-to-ruin-by-Sean-Larkan.pdf (defining “leverage” as “the average ration
between associates (in this context, all non-partner lawyer fee earners) and
partners (total partners, including both equity and non-equity”)).
89
The system of billing in six-minute increments was pioneered by United
States lawyer Reginald Herber Smith in the early 1940s. The idea was first
proposed in Smith’s book, Law Office Organization (1943). For a discussion
about Reginald Herber Smith and the history of the billable hour, see RONALD J.
BAKER, IMPLEMENTING VALUE PRICING: A RADICAL BUSINESS MODEL FOR
PROFESSIONAL FIRMS 115–17 (2010).
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charge out rates, results in increased partner profit. Similarly, the
more hours billed by the junior lawyers, the more profit is created.
B. The Push for Profit
Because lawyers have had a monopoly on providing legal
services for so long, lawyer costs have spiraled upward. It is now
common to see competitions within firms over hours billed, either
in the form of overt competition tables or simply by publishing
hours billed weekly by each employee. This pressure on lawyers to
maintain or increase hours billed again leads to unhealthy work
practices. There is little wonder that the general public sees lawyers
as greedy90 and psychopathic.91 This incentive to bill creates some
perverse behaviors. For example, the longer it takes to complete a
job the higher the bill and the better it is for the individual lawyer
and the firm. A solicitor who takes longer to complete jobs will
appear more valuable to a firm than a solicitor who completes jobs
quickly.92 As Justice Kirby noted, “[t]he system of billable hours can
reward the slow-witted lawyer. It can penalize the experienced, wise
and efficient.”93 Similarly, it must be hard for junior lawyers to resist
the urge at times to put the thumb on the scale and charge just one
more unit per matter in order to make their individual monthly
budgets. Also, the annual pay increase discussion for employed
lawyers is immovably tied to, and is more than covered by, an
increased charge out rate.
90
See, e.g., Stephen Glover, A Plague on Lawyers: Stephen Glover’s
Blisteringly Provocative Critique on the Greed, Self-Importance and Lack of
Scruples of Britain’s Last Unreformed Vested Interest Group, DAILY MAIL (Feb.
11, 2017), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4213998/A-critique-greedBritain-s-lawyers.html (citing a recent American poll that ranked lawyers as being
the most greedy profession). The comments to this article from readers are telling
on the thoughts of the general public about lawyers.
91
See Eric Barker, Which Professions Have the Most Psychopaths? The
Fewest?, TIME (Mar. 21, 2014) (citing KEVIN DUTTON, THE WISDOM OF
PSYCHOPATHS (2012)), http://time.com/32647/which-professions-have-the-mostpsychopaths-the-fewest/ (noting lawyers as ranked second, behind only CEOs of
companies). I question whether CEO is a profession based on the definition given
earlier, but nevertheless, second!
92
Kirby, supra note 48, at 259.
93
Id.
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This trend towards increasing partner profits gained impetus in
the United States around 1985 when the magazine The American
Lawyer began publishing the annual profit per partner figures for
law firms.94 Instead of competition leading to reduced prices as one
might expect in a healthy competitive environment, the competition
among law firms has become to increase profits per partner. Thirst
for greater personal profits leads people to act in certain ways and it
is no accident that partner incomes increase year upon year.95 These
metrics of firm performance have themselves become a commodity.
Thomson Reuters, for example, provides “competitive legal
benchmarking” on law firms around the world on its “Peer Monitor”
platform.96 Currell and Henderson use the returns to partners as their
measure of law firm success. They reason that this is “because
industry health is generally measured by market value or profits, not
by total employment or whether everyone who wants a job can get
one on the terms they want.”97 Conversely, I suggest that this
approach to measuring success in the legal profession is precisely
why the profession is in such dire circumstances.
This focus on profit sharing among groups of lawyers has driven
an unhealthy approach to the provision of legal services. To become
a partner, a lawyer must demonstrate a consistent level of client
billings. If billing clients large sums of money is the incentive to
lawyers’ progress within the firm, then this is exactly what will
happen. Sometimes, though, despite lawyers reaching billing
benchmarks, partners will seek to maintain the extreme profits of the
partnership for themselves and often make joining the partnership a
94

See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law, NEW REPUBLIC (July
21, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113941/big-law-firms-trouble-whenmoney-dries.
95
Partner salaries have recently become more balanced. See Katie Walsh, Law
Firm Partner Salaries Stall but Are Still $1m a Year, FIN. REV. (Aug. 4, 2017),
http://www.afr.com/business/legal/law-firm-partner-salaries-stall-but-are-still1m-a-year-20170802-gxo5yc. But, one million dollars a year (after rent, labor
costs, and reinvestment)—is any lawyer worth that much? This is a monopolist
price.
96
Peer Monitor, THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.co
m/law-products/solutions/peer-monitor (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
97
Daniel G. Currell & M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver’s
Seat?, INT’L REV. L. & ECON., June 2014, at 18 n.7.
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continuously disappearing horizon for these lawyers. This can lead
to the senior lawyers in a firm becoming disenchanted.
This quest for profit has diverted the legal profession from its
professional roots and it has become a business instead. I do not
mean to say, and neither could I, that all lawyers within firms have
lost their professional character. There is a worrying, and perhaps
growing, perception of lawyers as greedy and sharp, and this is
leading clients to look for alternatives. Those on the outside of the
law firm tent are more than happy to provide those alternatives and
to disrupt the BigLaw model.
C. Law Firm Statistics Show that Law has Become a Business
We should not let BigLaw define the entire legal profession.98
There are many sole practitioners, community legal centres, Legal
Aid lawyers and not-for-profit legal service providers that truly do
exist to provide a service to the community. However, lawyers are
predominantly employed in law firms. There are 1,338,678 lawyers
in the United States,99 which means that there is one lawyer for every
244 people.100 It is difficult to get an accurate picture of the number

98

See George Beaton, Will It be the LPOs That Drive #BigLaw Business Model
Change?, BEATON CAP. (June 22, 2012), http://www.beatoncapital.com
/2012/06/will-it-be-the-lpos-that-drive-biglaw-business-model-change/.
According to Beaton, BigLaw is:
short-hand for the large law firm, partnership-based law firm business
model. These firms represent some $200billion in revenues around the
world and number between 200 and 300, depending on how ‘large’ is
defined. Many are still single jurisdiction firms, but an increasing
number are globalising. The largest are $2billion+ in size and the smaller
ones ~$100million . . . . (From the perspective of a single jurisdiction,
like Australia for example, perhaps 30-40 firms constitute #BigLaw.).
Id.
99
See A.B.A., ABA NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: LAWYER
POPULATION BY STATE (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad
ministrative/market_research/National_Lawyer_Population_by_State_2018.pdf.
100
The current population is 327,167,434 according to the United States Census
Bureau. United States: 2018 Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/searchresults.html?q=population&page=1&stateGeo=none&searchtype=web&cssp=S
ERP (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
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of lawyers employed in law firms,101 but one account estimates that
it is approximately 75%.102 In Australia, where, because of the
smaller market more fine-grained figures are recorded, a similar
proportion of lawyers in law firms is observed. On this closer
analysis, it is clear that law firms are the dominant employer of
lawyers. A report on the profile of lawyers in Australia conducted
for the New South Wales Law Society by Urbis in 2016 showed that,
in October 2016 there were 71,509 lawyers in Australia.103 Around
70% (or 50,000) of these lawyers were employed in private
practice.104 Further, 70% of these lawyers worked in a law firm of
between 2 and 40+ partners. These figures indicate that it is the law
firm model that employs by far the most lawyers and thus should
attract most attention.
Law firms are typically divided by reference to their size. The
world’s largest law firms are in the United States and the United
Kingdom.105 Through mergers (both international and local), some
of the world’s largest law firms have become mega law firms with
over $2 billion in revenue.106 Large firms continue to amalgamate
and take over smaller firms around the world and a growing number
of ultra large law firms now conduct business on a global scale. In
101

For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics published data on the group
“Legal Services.” See NAICS 541100 – Legal Services, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_541100.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
However, this group includes lawyers, law clerks, judges, magistrates, judicial
workers, arbitrators, mediators, conciliators, paralegals, and legal assistants. See
id.
102
Sally Kane, Working in a Private Practice Law Firm, BALANCE CAREERS
(Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/law-firm-life-2164667.
103
URBIS PTY LTD, NATIONAL PROFILE OF SOLICITORS 2016 REPORT 2 (2017).
[hereinafter URBIS REPORT], https://www.lawsociety.com.au/sites/default/files/2
018-04/NATIONAL%20PROFILE%20OF%20SOLICITORS%202016.
compressed.pdf.
104
Id. at 19.
105
Staci Zaretsky, The Global 100: Fractured Futures At The Richest Law
Firms In The World (2017), ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:35 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/the-global-100-fractured-futures-at-therichest-law-firms-in-the-world-2017/.
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George Beaton, Will We See a $10 Billion BigLaw Firm?, BEATON CAP.
(May 11, 2015), http://www.beatoncapital.com/2015/05/will-we-see-a-10billion-biglaw-firm/.
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the protected environment within the monopoly on legal services,
law firms have been able to form these cartels among firms that have
now developed law as a multi-billion dollar business.107 From his
window, it would be difficult for the man on the Clapham omnibus
to perceive the tenets of professionalism in these multinational
firms.
D. Incorporated Legal Practices
Another more recent aspect of law firms that shows the shift
from law as a profession to law as a business is the incorporated
legal practice. In the United States, paragraph (d) of Rule 5.4 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct restricts ownership of law
firms to lawyers. This applies also to law firms set up as Professional
Limited Liability Companies (PLLCs) that operate on a similar basis
to normal limited liability companies that cannot issue stock. In
other jurisdictions, legal practices or firms of lawyers have been
allowed to incorporate and issue shares in the incorporated entity,
for example, in the United Kingdom since 2007, and Australia since
2001.108 This takes the law as a business model one step further away
from a profession. Rationales for this practice include that it limits
liability for partners for the wrongs of their co-partners and gives
autonomy to partners in law firms to choose the structure under
which they operate.109 However, other reasons are more financial in
nature and include to “reduce tax on law firm profits . . . [build] a
capital base for expansion . . . and [create] a more efficient and
effective management structure.”110 Thornton argued that this
initiative to allow law firms to incorporate “reveals perhaps more
clearly than any other the extent to which legal practice has been
imbued with the spirit of competition, which threatens to leave
professionalism languishing in the rear. Shareholders, after all, are
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Beaton, supra note 98.
See Legal Profession Amendment (Incorporated Legal Practices) Act 2000
(NSW) (Austl.).
109
Christine Parker, Law Firms Incorporated: How Incorporation Could and
Should Make Firms More Ethically Responsible, 23 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 347, 350
(2004).
110
Id. at 351.
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primarily investors interested in maximizing the return on their
investment.”111
The incorporated partnership is often ultimately still controlled
by the same group—the partners of the firm. Being a partner in a
monopoly law firm provides no training for success as a business
person. In 2007, Slater and Gordon was the first law firm in the
world to go public.112 In 2010, Andrew Grech, formerly the Chief
Executive of Slater and Gordon, noted:
that the profession is increasingly embracing the concept of conducting
the business of a law practice through the incorporated legal practice
model . . . should be no surprise when the benefits are considered. These
include limited liability, less disruptive entry and exit from ownership,
the inclusion of non-lawyer owners as contributors to the success of the
enterprise, and greater capacity to raise debt and equity. 113

None of those proposed benefits mention a better or more
efficient service to clients or the tenets of professionalism. Mr.
Grech continued: “Incorporation has a number of advantages, but it
highlights the tensions between the role of the legal profession in the
administration of justice and upholding the rule of law, and the
demands on legal practitioners who are also charged with
responsibility for conducting a successful business enterprise.”114
In 2017, ten years after Slater and Gordon initially went public
in pursuit of its “successful business enterprise[,]” its share price
collapsed, and it was acquired by a consortium of international
hedge funds.115 In relation to Slater and Gordon’s demise, Adele
Ferguson in the Sydney Morning Herald noted that:
111

Margaret Thornton, The New Knowledge Economy and the Transformation
of the Law Discipline, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 265, 271 (2012).
112
Catherine Ho, A Law Firm IPO? Not So Fast., WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/a-law-firm-ipo-notso-fast/2015/02/16/d8085ff6-b09b-11e4-827f93f454140e2b_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.213bd62e7ceb.
113
Andrew Grech, New Legal Practices Embracing Incorporation,
AUSTRALIAN (July 9, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/legal-affairs/new-legal-practices-embracing-incorporation/newsstory/1e8b55f2703cfbdb04a376444b5bd046.
114
Id.
115
Adele Ferguson, Ex-Slater and Gordon Chief Andrew Grech Earns 5 per
cent of Company’s Value in Pay, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 1, 2017, 6:32
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Slater and Gordon went on a debt-fuelled acquisition binge that almost
destroyed it. But along the way it forgot its core values, which include
deep ties with the labour movement and representing the underdog, the
victim.
Britain is a tough market, with a number of Australian companies losing
a fortune. Hubris and greed would add Slater and Gordon to the list. 116

Technology played no part in Slater and Gordon’s demise but
hubris and greed did. This change to law as a business, as
exemplified by Slater and Gordon’s, has eroded the professional
character of the legal profession and the professionalism of lawyers.
It is no surprise then that it is the dysfunctional business model of
the law firm that disruptive enterprises have targeted. It is not
technology alone that will mean the end of the profession, which, as
discussed, has been in a long decline brought about in part by the
very structures through which it is practiced. What is left to disrupt
is the BigLaw business model.
There are now at least five broad forces working towards
disrupting the legal practice market. As discussed, the problems
facing the profession, now in the form of disruption from NewLaw
and new technologies, derive in part from the change from law as a
profession to law as a business after years of monopolist practices.
This drive for profit has forced a reaction from clients as consumers
of legal services. There are a number of clear trends in the legal
services market now that make it ripe for disruption from smaller,
more nimble suppliers.
V. FIVE FACTORS DISRUPTING THE LAW FIRM MODEL
As noted in Parts III and IV, the legal profession, with its
monopoly on providing legal services, has become a business. This
Part identifies five factors that, together, have begun to disrupt the
legal services business. Predominant among these forces is the
pressure that clients are exerting on law firms to charge less and to
use alternative fee models (AFM) such as fixed fees and retainer
agreements. However, there are a number of other interrelated
trends impacting the way big firms are having to deliver their
PM), http://www.smh.com.au/business/exslater-and-gordon-chief-andrew-grechearns-5-per-cent-of-companys-value-in-pay-20170901-gy8znt.html.
116
Id.
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services, that is: increasing numbers of NewLaw providers, the
increase in law graduates, the explosion in the number and types of
new technologies directed at law,117 and the freer access to the law
itself—what I call the “AustLII effect” and which is explained in
Part V.E below. This presents a threat to the incumbent legal service
providers, because it dilutes the legal profession’s monopoly.
Furlong noted the danger that the legal profession was failing to
maintain relevance.118 He argued that there were two preconditions
for the profession to maintain its privileged status: “First, the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer guild and the society it
served had to remain intact; second, lawyers had to be the only
viable option for the provision of legal services.”119 I have discussed
the failure of the profession to maintain its professional roots—
Furlong’s first precondition. The second condition proffered by
Furlong is also, as discussed in this Part, under extreme threat from
a number of forces that are operating to destroy the monopoly and
allow other providers into the market for legal services.
It will take perhaps a generation to completely destroy the
monopoly. Frey and Osborne argued that change at this scale was
difficult, not because of “the lack of inventive ideas that set the
boundaries for economic development, but rather powerful social
and economic interests promoting the technological status quo.”120
Law is a profession with a long history and deep and entrenched
interests in maintaining the status quo and holds great influence on
political power. However, disruption is insistent and, in the case of
the legal services industry, multi-faceted.

Christensen calls this continual onslaught of technology the “technology
mudslide.” See CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 7 (2013).
118
Furlong, supra note 28, at 421.
119
Id.
120
Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC.
CHANGE 254, 256 (2017) (citing J.A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (1962)).
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A. Client Reactions to Overcharging
Under the protection of the monopoly, lawyers and law firms
have been able to overcharge for legal services. Clients have begun
to respond to this behavior in a number of significant ways. In an
extreme example, in 2017, a Silicon Valley company, tired of
paying the fees charged by law firms, created its own law firm and
intends to use new technologies to streamline the work previously
performed by their external lawyers.121 Corporate clients are also
trying to minimize legal spending in other, less dramatic ways,
including, as discussed below, reducing the amount they spend on
external lawyers and doing more work in-house using new
technologies and freer access to the law.
Reducing the Amount Spent on Lawyers
Furlong noted that “the longstanding asymmetry of knowledge
between lawyers and clients is rebalancing fast, and this will realign
the power dynamics between the two just as quickly.”122 As an
example, powerful and tech-savvy clients such as Microsoft are
already withdrawing legal work from traditional law firm suppliers
and demanding alternative models of legal service delivery.123
Currently around 60% of Microsoft’s external legal matters are dealt
with by firms using fee structures other than the traditional billable
hour. Microsoft intends to increase that to 90% within two years.124
How law firms will respond to this push from corporate clients is
still unknown but reports of heavy discounting of legal bills are
beginning to emerge that may provide some clues.125
121

Elizabeth Dwoskin, This Silicon Valley Start-up Wants to Replace Lawyers
with Robots, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/innovations/wp/2017/09/14/this-silicon-valley-startup-wants-to-replacelawyers-with-robots/?utm_term=.be17b1511311.
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Furlong, supra note 28, at 431.
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David Ruiz, Microsoft Rethinks Law Firm Relationships as 13 Join
Alternative Billing and Diversity Initiative, LEGAL WK. (Aug. 8, 2017, 8:11 AM),
http://www.legalweek.com/sites/legalweek/2017/08/08/microsoft-rethinks-lawfirm-relationships-as-13-firms-join-alternative-billing-and-diversity-push/.
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Id.
125
See, e.g., MELBOURNE LAW SCHOOL & THOMSON REUTERS, 2015
AUSTRALIA: STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 12 (2015) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
LEGAL MARKET], http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/168915
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This is an international phenomenon. For example, in 2014, the
Canadian Bar Association published a report titled Futures:
Transforming the Delivery of Legal Services in Canada. The
Futures report noted that clients were calling for lower legal costs
and certainty in billing.126 These changes are having an effect on the
lawyers’ monopoly too, as large law firms are being forced to
innovate to retain clients.
As discussed in Part III, a lack of incentive to innovate is a
recognized problem with monopolies.127 That law firms are
responding to client pressure on fees and seeking to innovate may
indicate that the monopoly is dissipating. The 2017 State of the
Legal Market report noted that: “many firms have added or elevated
innovation as a major element of their business strategy. There is no
uniform approach, but many firms are experimenting with
innovation committees, shark-tank-type innovation competitions,
hackathons, app development and incubators.”128
In-house counsel and other legally trained corporate advisers are
also weaponized by the easy access to eager NewLaw lawyers who
can use the latest legal technologies, but without the overheads.
Work Moving In-House
Increasingly, companies are bringing legal work in-house rather
than spending on external law firms. In Australia, the 2017 Urbis
Report noted an increase in the number of in-house legal counsel
between 2011 and 2016 of over 45% from 7,325 to 11,675.129
According to another report, this one prepared by Mahlab, on
Corporate Counsel, the impact of growing in-house teams within
corporations:

3/2015AUReportFINAL1.pdf (“The Asian Lawyer, January 1, 2015 reported that
HWL Ebsworth’s growth could be attributed to aggressive lateral partner hires
and pricing. They cited the firm willing to offer a 40 to 50% price discount to
comparable firms in order to win work.”).
126
CANADIAN BAR ASSOC., FUTURES: TRANSFORMING THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES IN CANADA 20 (2014), https://www.cba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/
cba_na/PDFs/CBA%20Legal%20Futures%20PDFS/Futures-Final-eng.pdf.
127
MOTTA, supra note 15, at 56–57.
128
STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET, supra note 125, at 9.
129
URBIS REPORT, supra note 103, at 21.
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is significant and ongoing. The big law firms are meeting these
challenges by reshaping their services to offer more flexible fee
structures and increase efficiency, and relying on outsourcing (usually
offshore) to provide more streamlined and cost-effective offerings.
However, there has been a circa 30% decrease in briefs to private law
firms, with the average individual external legal spend by Australian
corporations now sitting well below AUD $2 million. External lawyers
are generally sought for specialist advice on key projects or for the
firepower required for a multi-million or billion dollar transaction. Even
then, corporations are flexing muscle, hiring specialists in order to keep
the work in-house.130

In-house counsel can themselves also use new technologies that
are able to interrogate the laws and provide concise advice far faster
than law firms. In response, law firms continue to look for ways to
retain clients by offering reduced fees and by themselves adopting
new technologies.
B. Too Many Lawyers
In 2016, The New York Times reported that after access to loans
to students was made freer in 2006, “[l]aw schools jacked up tuition
and accepted more students, even after the legal job market stalled
and shrank in the wake of the recession.”131 This resulted in two
outcomes, a “drastic drop in law school applications since 2011 . . .
[and that] to maintain enrolment numbers, law schools have had to
lower their admissions standards and take even more unqualified
students.”132 Note that they did not reduce the number of law
students entering law schools from those numbers inflated after
2006. In 2016, the American Bar Association issued its Report on
the Future of Legal Services in the United States133 which noted that
“data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that
unemployment for recent law graduates remains significantly higher
compared to the national average across other labor categories.”134
130

MAHLAB, supra note 32, at 4.
The Law School Debt Crisis, N.Y. TIMES: EDITORIAL BOARD (Oct. 24,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/the-law-schooldebt-crisis.html.
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Id. at 16 (citing Dwoskin, supra note 121) (highlighting the paradox that an
increase in law graduates has not rectified a deficit in access to justice).
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Jordon Furlong highlighted “a total population of unemployed and
underemployed American lawyers in the tens of thousands, one that
swells a little more every year.”135
In a similar trend, the number of law graduates in Australia has
increased significantly in the past 20 years,136 and this trend is set to
continue.137 Australia now has 39 Law Schools, some of which have
intakes in first year of over 1,200 students. 138 In 2015, after reports
that the number of law graduates in Australia had increased to
around 15,000, the Council of Australian Law Deans (CALD)
sought to assuage concerns by publishing the “actual” number of
law graduates in 2015 as only 7,583.139 Whatever the correct figure
is, the number is arguably greater than is required by existing law
firms.
As discussed in Part IV, there are now 71,509 lawyers in
Australia—or 1 lawyer for every 343 people. On one reckoning,
continually increasing the number of lawyers in the market reduces
the profit available to, and dilutes the market dominance of,
incumbent law firms. This is in fact what we are witnessing as the
increased number of NewLaw suppliers that are stemming from this
rash of new law graduates eats into the legal services market
dominated by BigLaw.140
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Croucher, supra note 26, at 491–94.
137
Gwilym Croucher & Peter Woelert, How Australia Got So Many Law
Schools, UNIV. MELBOURNE, https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/howaustralia-got-so-many-law-schools (last visited June 22, 2018).
138
See Australia’s Law Schools, STUDYING LAW IN AUSTL.,
https://cald.asn.au/slia/australias-law-schools/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
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C. NewLaw and Non-Law
This oversupply of lawyers leads to the next pressure on the big
law firm monopoly on providing legal services; new entrants to the
market, eager to provide an alternative model to the law firm, have
begun to make inroads into the legal services business. In the
following subparts of Part V.C, I describe some of the disruptive
forces affecting the market, including NewLaw providers, those
who are not lawyers but are now able to provide services that law
firms used typically to provide, and the growing prevalence of
onshoring and offshoring that law firms can now use to cut down on
overheads and duplication.
NewLaw
There are almost daily reports of new NewLaw legal service
providers entering the market.141 The term NewLaw was coined in
2013 by Beaton Capital analyst Eric Chin,142 who described them
thus:
These firms are designed around virtual work spaces and rely on the rise
of supertemps. Supertemps are lawyers who have been trained by
traditional BigLaw firms who are now looking for flexible work
arrangements. These alternative business model (ABM) legal services
providers are able to provide the same or similar service levels to
BigLaw—but at or below incumbents’ break-even points.143

The idea of what NewLaw is has evolved in the last four years
to include a range of start-up firms or sole practitioners that provide
legal services in innovative ways using (either new or existing)

(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/sme-law/22256-law-firmwithout-lawyers-opens-its-doors.
141
For example, see generally the reports on ARTIFICIAL LAW.,
https://www.artificiallawyer.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019).
142
Eric Chin, 2018: The Year Axiom Becomes the World’s Largest Legal
Services Firm, BEATON CAP. (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.beatoncapital.com/
2013/09/2018-year-axiom-becomes-worlds-largest-legal-services-firm/.
143
Id. This is the textbook definition of disruption. See Christensen, Raynor &
McDonald, supra note 1, at 46.
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technology.144 NewLaw providers include LegalZoom145 and
RocketLawyer146 in the United States, and LawPath and Nexus Law
Group in Australia.147 LegalZoom and NexusLawyers provide
lawyers on demand to deliver legal work at a contracted price
outside of the traditional law firm partnership model. Because they
do not have the overhead costs of law firm office space, employee
costs, or law firm artworks, they are able to access and use the vast
array of technology that is currently available to provide legal
services at a significantly reduced cost. More and more lawyers who
have become disillusioned with the fading prospects of partnership
in traditional law firms are joining the ranks of NewLaw. These

144

See Jordan Furlong & Sean Larkan, A Brief Inventory of NewLaw in
Australia, AUSTL. LEGAL PRAC. MGMT. ASS’N (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://www.alpma.com.au/a-survival-guide-for-legal-practicemanagers/inventory-of-new-law-in-Australia.
145
See LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/country/au (last visited Feb.
8, 2019) (“LegalZoom provides the legal solutions you need to start a business,
run a business, file a trademark application, make a will, create a living trust, file
bankruptcy, change your name, and handle a variety of other common legal
matters for small businesses and families.”).
146
See ROCKET LAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com/home.rl (last visited
Feb. 8, 2019). RocketLawyer allows clients to type in a legal query which is
answered by a lawyer within a network of lawyers around the United States who
provide the advice at low cost. Id. The site also provides a document review
system the same way or allows you to create a new document (such as a contract)
quickly and easily online without the need for a lawyer. Id.
147
See NEXUS LAW GROUP, https://www.nexuslawyers.com.au/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2019). Nexus Law Group’s website claims that:
OpenLaw™ is a unique cloud-based practice management system that
connects a network of senior specialist lawyers into a single operating
platform, allowing them to work together seamlessly as one firm for the
benefit of the client. OpenLaw enables Nexus to connect high-end,
independent expertise with clients under a ‘direct access model’, more
cost effectively than traditionally structured firms. The system
incentivises collaboration and specialisation, which results in better
outcomes for both lawyers and clients, without traditional firm
overheads.
Id.
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NewLaw providers are attractive to in-house lawyers who are under
increasing pressure to reduce legal spending.148
Non-law Legal Service Providers
Another recent trend is the proliferation of alternative suppliers
of services that were traditionally performed by law firms. These not
only include the resurrected multi-disciplinary firms set up by the
big four accounting firms,149 but, because of the ubiquity of new
technology, also companies that were not traditionally seen as
competitors to law firms who can now provide services that were
traditionally performed by law firms. For example, ANZ bank now
advertises that it can set up everything a business needs to create a
modern company:
ANZ Business Ready® powered by Honcho can turn your business idea
into reality quickly and easily. In a few guided steps you can receive your
ABN, register your business name, set up a website, organise banking
for your business and more.150

Many of these tasks were traditionally performed and charged
for by law firms when new businesses sought their advice—for
significantly more than $26 per month. This trend, aided by the
availability of new technologies, looks set to continue to increase
the pressure on law firms worldwide. Susskind and Susskind also
reported that, in England:
[R]esearch suggests that almost two thirds of individuals would prefer to
receive legal help from high-street brands than from conventional law
firms. The Co-Op Bank in England has said that it will offer legal
services from around 350 of its bank branches, while other well-known
non-legal businesses, like BT, the telecommunications company, and the
AA, the motoring association, have also committed to providing a range
of everyday legal services. The solo lawyer is under threat.151

148

Emma Ryan, The New Face of Corporate Counsel, LAW. WKLY. (Oct. 20,
2017), https://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/features/22100-the-new-face-ofcorporate-counsel.
149
See Sol Dolor, Big Four Firm Launches Legal Services Market Assault,
AUSTRALASIAN LAW. (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.australasianlawyer.com.au/n
ews/big-four-firm-launches-legal-services-market-assault-245444.aspx.
150
Start a Business, AUSTL. & N.Z. BANKING GROUP LIMITED,
https://www.anz.com.au/personal/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
151
SUSSKIND, supra note 10, at 67 (internal citations omitted).
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New technologies are making access to law more available, not
only to the average citizens, but to other service providers who are
able to perform legal tasks, once the domain of law firms, at a
reduced cost and in an attractively packaged form. Although these
new service providers sound ideal, one thing that might be lacking
in this service arrangement from the client’s perspective, is the
familiarity with the client’s business and ways of working that law
firms have obtained because they have traditionally been the only
provider.
Offshoring and onshoring
Another trend mostly evident in BigLaw firms is to “offshore”152
everyday work to jurisdictions that provide services at a far cheaper
price than paying junior lawyers. Some law firms now send
document review, discovery or document drafting to providers in,
say, India, who will often provide a better service for a much
cheaper price. Firms are still working on client confidentiality and
client legal privilege issues that arise so that they can send more
work offshore in this way, but this trend is obviously attractive to
reduce costs for a limited range of work for law firms.
Another similar trend for multi-national firms is to onshore
work. Onshoring is similar to offshoring but the firm sets up its own
factory of paralegals, hired by the firm in a cheaper jurisdiction to
do work provided by lawyers within the firm in offices around the
world.153 This factory of paralegals can provide twenty-four-hour
service and, because the workers are retained by the firm, issues of
confidentiality and privilege do not arise.
The ubiquity of new (and sometimes not-so-new) technologies
has allowed NewLaw providers and non-lawyers to do increasing
amounts of work that was traditionally performed by law firms.
Examples of not-so-new technologies include the smartphone and
the home computer. These devices are now incredibly powerful and
152
See Alan S. Blinder & Alan B. Krueger, Alternative Measures of
Offshorability: A Survey Approach, J. LABOR ECON., Apr. 2013, at S117
(estimating that approximately 23.6 percent of all professional and related
occupations could be offshored).
153
See Loyita Worley, Outsourcing, Offshoring, Nearshoring, Onshoring –
What’s Going On?, LEGAL INFO. MGMT., Apr. 2012, at 11.
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versatile tools that have unlimited access to the internet and can
allow providers of all types to access the law and provide legal
services from anywhere in the world at any time. The increasingly
available range of new technologies directed at the legal services
market that can be accessed through these devices multiplies the
impact on the traditional legal services providers. Without even
discussing new technologies, these old(er) devices have also opened
up the legal services market to almost anyone. Furlong coined the
term self-navigators to describe:
the growing population of people and businesses that make use of the
developing suite of tools and providers outside of law firms - the
emerging legal support ecosystem. These people and businesses are not
engaged in traditional “self-representation”; they are simply taking on
basic and straightforward aspects of the legal process while leaving the
more complex issues to lawyers.154

The diverse and growing range of NewLaw providers and the
work being done by self-navigators and non-law firm providers
continues to eat away at the law firm monopoly.
D. New Technologies
Susskind and Susskind argued that the high prices charged by
lawyers because of their monopoly restricted access to the law. They
argued that the increasing commoditization of traditional law jobs
and new technology would combine to destroy the monopoly and
end the profession. However, if we peel a layer more than Susskind
and Susskind do,155 we can see that the problems associated with
monopolies have created the very basis of, and the reasons for, the
disruption of the legal profession. This fatal flaw in the historical
structures of the profession and the way the structures have been
manipulated by lawyers for nearly a century has left the profession
open to disruption. This particular chink in the armor of the legal
profession has nothing to do with technology. But it is the new
technology that is being used to disrupt the business of law.
There is already a proliferation of technology tools on the market
that offer to make every aspect of legal practice faster, more
accessible to a broader range of providers and clients, and more
154
155

Furlong, supra note 28, at 428.
SUSSKIND & SUSSKIND, supra note 3, at 33.
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efficient.156 It is not the law nor lawyers that are being directly
threatened but the law firm businesses that have been overcharging.
The attacks are surgically directed at the very barriers to the legal
service market identified earlier. They are driven by a reaction to the
issues raised in this part but are directed to providing greater and
cheaper access to the law.
Rodney Brooks, Australian roboticist and Panasonic Professor
of Robotics (emeritus) at MIT, identified the need for pragmatism
when discussing the impact of new technologies and cited what has
been termed Amara’s law: that “[w]e tend to overestimate the effect
of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the
long run.”157 While the potential of technology to disrupt the legal
profession outlined in this Part is great, the work required to design,
create, and train these tools is hard and laborious. Because law is a
complicated social construct, technologists must conquer computer
engineering bottlenecks in creative and social intelligence.158
Artificial intelligence (AI) legal tools are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and have demonstrated an ability to undertake certain
legal tasks traditionally within the sole purview of a lawyer or
paralegal. The most prominent developments have occurred in the
areas of document review in discovery159 and contract analysis,160

156

Stanford Law School CodeX Index has collated 771 companies that provide
technology for the legal services market. See Discover Legal Technology, STAN.
L. SCH., https://techindex.law.stanford.edu/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
157
Rodney Brooks, The Seven Deadly Sins of Predicting the Future of AI,
RODNEY BROOKS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://rodneybrooks.com/the-seven-deadlysins-of-predicting-the-future-of-ai/.
158
Frey & Osborne, supra note 120, at 262.
159
See, e.g., RELATIVITY, https://www.relativity.com/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2019) (providing an example of an eDiscovery firm).
160
See, e.g., KIRA, https://kirasystems.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (giving
an example of a contract review firm); LAWGEEX, https://www.lawgeex.com/
(last visited Jan. 15, 2019) (providing an example of a contract review firm).
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legal research,161 case outcome prediction,162 and expertise
automation.163
Document Review
Law firms have embraced AI applications in the document
review area. While document review processes, particularly in
discovery, have been targeted for automation by various vendors in
the past, new AI applications have been shown to enhance the
process. Natural language processing (NLP), machine learning, and
other AI techniques are being applied to many aspects of the contract
life cycle, including discovery, analysis, and due diligence.164 These
programs are able to process legal documents and identify contract
provisions and critical data, including in non-standard formats like
tables and forms.
Machine learning is most often associated with e-discovery
applications but also underpins contract analysis and case
predictions.165 Machine learning is a sub-field of artificial
intelligence which has advanced exponentially in the last twenty to
thirty years because of increases in computer power, large available
datasets, massive investment in learning and development, and
better algorithms.166 Computers are now adept at processing vast
amounts of data, such as cases and journal articles, and at retrieving
relevant data more accurately and efficiently than a human lawyer.167
Computer scientists are actively working on creating applications
161

See, e.g., ROSS INTELLIGENCE, http://www.rossintelligence.com/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2019) (giving an example of legal research provider).
162
See, e.g., LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019)
(providing an example of a case prediction provider).
163
See, e.g., NEOTA LOGIC, https://www.neotalogic.com/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2019) (giving an example of an expert system developer).
164
Michael Mills & Julian Uebergang, Artificial Intelligence in Law: An
Overview, PRECED. SYD. NSW, Mar.–Apr. 2017, at 35.
165
See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 108–
10 (2014); Mills & Uebergang, supra note 164, at 35.
166
See Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots:
Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. TECH.
L. 385, 403–04 (2017).
167
See THE LAW SOC’Y OF NEW S. WALES, THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
INNOVATION IN THE PROFESSION 41 (2017), https://www.lawsociety.com.au/
sites/default/files/2018-03/1272952.pdf.
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that can recognize principles in legal judgments,168 and training
computers to solve legal problems.169 Through a process of training
machines to identify and classify certain characteristics of
documents for example, the machine, once trained, can process a
very large number of documents extremely quickly and much more
efficiently than a room full of junior lawyers. In contract analytics,
Kira Systems170 claims that “users consistently report time savings
of 20–40% the first time using the software, and up to 90% or more
with experience.”171 LawGeex claims that using its product to review
contracts results in a time saving over more traditional methods of
80% and a cost saving of 90%.172 LawGeex also conducted a test
comparing the performance of AI against twenty human lawyers in
reviewing standard non-disclosure agreements. The lawyers and
LawGeex’s AI reviewed five non-disclosure agreements to identify
risks in the terms of the agreement. The human lawyers were able to
do this with 85% accuracy. The AI was 94% accurate. The human
lawyers took on average 51 minutes to complete the review of the
five agreements. The AI took 26 seconds.173
Technology assisted review uses statistical models, natural
language processing and machine learning to electronically classify

168

See, e.g., Olga Shulayeva, Advaith Siddharthan & Adam Wyner,
Recognizing Cited Facts and Principles in Legal Judgements, 25 ARTIF. INTELL.
L. 107, 109–11 (2017) (reporting on studies using supervised machine learning to
annotate sentences containing legal facts and principles in cases).
169
See, e.g., L. Karl Branting, Data-centric and Logic-based Models for
Automated Legal Problem Solving, 25 ARTIF. INTELL. L. 5, 6 (2017) (“In recent
years, a new area of research has emerged that performs legal problem-solving
using knowledge induced from collections of legal documents or other large data
sets.”).
170
See KIRA, supra note 160.
171
See KIRA: BENEFITS, https://www.kirasystems.com/benefits/law-firms/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2019).
172
LAWGEEX, supra note 160.
173
AI
vs.
Lawyers:
The
Ultimate
Showdown,
LAWGEEX,
https://www.lawgeex.com/AIvsLawyer/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). For a full
version of the report, see LAWGEEX, COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO HUMAN LAWYERS IN THE REVIEW OF STANDARD
BUSINESS
CONTRACTS
(2018),
http://ai.lawgeex.com/rs/345-WGV842/images/LawGeex%20eBook%20Al%20vs%20Lawyers%202018.pdf.
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documents based on input from expert reviewers.174 With repeated
use, the program learns more sophisticated review techniques and
becomes more adept at finding and collating only relevant
documents. As these systems develop, they are increasingly
accepted as not only more efficient than manual review but also as
more accurate.175
These are undoubtedly complex tasks, but it is likely that
machines will quickly become better at these tasks than human
lawyers. This document review was work that was traditionally done
by teams of junior lawyers, holed up in data rooms for months at a
time to review documents and then manually enter information into
a report for the client. Law firms relished this type of work because
they could bill the client for the work of the junior lawyers and make
more profit. Junior lawyers would benefit from reviewing
sometimes thousands of different legal documents and from meeting
budget. Because of this, clients would pay handsomely for the
review process. They are no longer willing to do so and if there are
machines that can do the same, or a better, job with an 80% saving,
then clients will insist on using the machines. This will indubitably
affect the profits of law firms and firms will resist change for this
reason. It will take a culture shift or an alternative billing model to
convince lawyers to abandon the leveraging model. However, as
discussed, these changes appear inexorable.
Legal Research
Another job traditionally given to junior lawyers was legal
research. It was much cheaper for a junior lawyer to research the
latest law on a given matter at a lower charge out rate than a partner.
Now, AI driven programs are revolutionizing legal research,
building upon the digitalization that has occurred over the last 20
years.176 A number of companies have developed applications that
are able to conduct legal research and this process will improve the
174

Mills & Uebergang, supra note 164, at 35.
Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in
E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient than Exhaustive Manual
Review, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 48 (2011).
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Sherry Xin Chen & Mary Ann Neary, Artificial Intelligence Legal Research
and Law Librarians, AALL SPECTRUM, May–June 2017 17.
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more it is used. The providers of legal research applications include
Ravel Law, ROSS Intelligence, Lexis Answers, Westlaw Answers,
and Blue J Legal, all of which claim to offer artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and natural language processing to identify key
cases, and to extract relevant passages of judgments based on natural
language search terms. Already, these applications are providing
faster and more relevant answers to legal searches than any junior
lawyer could. For example, ROSS Intelligence uses the NLP power
behind IBM’s Watson cognitive computer program to allow natural
question and answer style legal research from the desktop. NLP and
machine learning allows the program to understand the context and
meaning of the user’s question, and deliver more relevant results
than Boolean or NLP processes alone.177
Preparing the systems needed to conduct research that appears
effortless takes time and effort. It takes time to clean the data and
train the algorithms, but as the big repositories of the law are opened
up to better and faster AI legal research tools, trained on larger and
larger data sets, this way of researching will likely become more
available and cheaper. This will allow not only law firms, but
corporations to use platforms such as ROSS to circumvent law firms
for their legal research. It will also eat at the work traditionally
performed by junior lawyers.
Case Prediction
Combining access to large, structured data sets with AI
techniques such as NLP and machine learning, legal technology
developers are producing analytical tools that can predict likely case
outcomes with greater accuracy than legal experts.178 LexisNexis’
Lex Machina is a litigation data platform originally developed to use
data mining and predictive analytics techniques to forecast
outcomes of United States intellectual property litigation.
LexisNexis’ “Professional Services” package is currently able to
provide early IP case assessment. It can also prepare profiles on the
177

DAVID HOULIHAN, ROSS INTELLIGENCE AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
LEGAL RESEARCH 11 (2017).
178
Nick Hilborne, AI Crunches Lawyers in Case Prediction Challenge, LEGAL
FUTURES (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/aicrunches-lawyers-case-prediction-challenge.
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parties, law firms, and judges involved and assess likely damages
awards and lawyer fees.179 In case prediction, Lex Machina claims
that it “mine[s] litigation data, revealing insights never before
available about judges, lawyers, parties, and the subjects of the cases
themselves, culled from millions of pages of litigation
information.”180 The information available allows Lex Machina to
predict:
[h]ow likely . . . a judge [is] to grant or deny a specific motion . . . , how
long . . . case[s] [might] take to get to a grant of a permanent injunction,
to trial, or to termination before a judge [and] how likely . . . a judge [is]
to find infringement of a patent, fair use of a trademark, or a Securities
Act violation.181

Clients will be able to predict the outcome of a case with a
relative degree of certainty much earlier than the day of the
hearing—the traditional timeframe.182 This will save clients money
but, again, will erode law firm profit margins even further. While
the results of the machine analysis of large amounts of data seems
to create accurate predictions, this way of mining data, particularly
about personal attributes of judges and participants is troubling, not
the least because it has the potential to introduce forum shopping
and biases.183 Nevertheless, its attractiveness to clients who will be
able to relatively accurately predict the outcome of litigation before
they commit large sums of money is undeniable and will further
circumvent the preparatory work of law firms. This preparatory
work was not only profitable for the law firm in preparing for the
initial stages of litigation, but it also ultimately created a dilemma
179
What We Do, LEX MACHINA (2017), https://lexmachina.com/services/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2017).
180
Legal Analytics Platform, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/legalanalytics/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
181
Id.
182
See Nikolaos Aletras et al., Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective, PEERJ
COMPUTER SCI., Feb. 2016, at e93 (discussing judicial analytics and case
prediction in the European Court of Human Rights); Daniel L. Chen, Judicial
Analytics and the Great Transformation of American Law, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE & L. (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-018-9237-x (last
visited Jan. 15, 2019) (discussing the challenges in reducing the bias in the
process).
183
Further analysis on this point is outside the scope of this paper.
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for clients in that they would spend and commit to the litigation past
the point of no return. An accurate prediction of the outcome of the
case before this money and effort is spent will allow clients to
tactically retreat before committing large sums of money to law firm
work from which there is no return.
Expertise Automation
Expertise automation refers to the development of programs that
combine the expertise of a lawyer in a particular area with an
artificially intelligent platform to automate the processes of that
expert. These automated processes are making once specialized
legal services more consistent and accessible to clients at lower cost.
Expert systems include web-based systems prepared by legal
experts to provide scripted answers to structured questions.184 The
structured interrogation tends to follow a flow chart style of
question/response until either a solution is provided or the client is
directed to a live expert. At each stage of the interaction, the
questioner is provided, or can access, information to inform them of
the law or their legal rights. A good example of a company that
provides expert systems is Neota Logic, which offers “an AIpowered platform and comprehensive toolset that allows
professionals to rapidly build and deploy application solutions that
automate their expertise.” 185
These expertise systems are able to systematise repetitive tasks
that lawyers would normally spend time on each time they engaged
a client. Allowing the expertise system to provide this mundane and
repetitive service frees the lawyer’s time so that they can concentrate
on more important matters (or altogether, depending on who you
ask). For example, King & Wood Mallesons has adopted a Neota
Logic application that, through a series of answers to set questions,
helps international clients determine whether their deals require
Foreign Investment Review Board approval.186 King & Wood
184
See Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential
Approach to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REV. 168,
172 (1986).
185
See NEOTA LOGIC, https://www.neotalogic.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
186
See Nicola Berkovic, King & Wood Mallesons Turns to AI for Clients’
Needs,
AUSTRALIAN
(Nov.
1,
2016),

MAR. 2019] Tech, BigLaw, and the Computer Professional

455

Mallesons said that the application allowed the firm “to make the
most efficient use of its experts by enabling junior lawyers to take
on more of the grunt work . . . . You’re absolutely not making them
redundant, in fact it means that we’re getting the right work to the
right person.”187
The question is, what is the grunt work that these junior lawyers
are doing and what is the right work? Will junior lawyers be able to
gain the experience they once acquired from taking months to
painstakingly review thousands of legal documents and then
participate in drafting a report on those documents, or will the
machines continue to learn so that it can perfect its review and
reporting techniques? Are lawyers freer to concentrate on more
important matters, or do they become redundant in the case of junior
lawyers, or a slave to the profits created by the machine in the case
of law firm partners? Lawyers and law firms are grappling with
these questions now. These and other new and powerful tools are
leading to a shift in the way legal work is being conducted and
offered and further erodes the lawyers’ monopoly on providing legal
services.
E. Freer Access to Law – The Austlii Effect
Another trend that is pressuring the traditional work of law firms
is the increased free access to the law itself. As recently as around
20 years ago, the only way that a company or firm could obtain a
copy of the primary sources of law that affected or controlled that
company’s conduct was to consult lawyers who held hardcopies of
legislation and cases in their firm libraries. Lawyers would then
consult the hard copies, and prepare (often lengthy) advice to the
company controllers setting out the law and how it might apply to
the company’s situation. This was typically (and I suspect still is)
the way that lawyers would issue legal advice. It is time consuming
and costly, and, therefore, profitable for law firms. It also does not
often adequately address the issue that the client was concerned
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/king--wood-mallesonsturns-to-ai-to-meet-clients-needs/newsstory/2784a2f7f3948d9c213a63b96526f81c.
187
Id.
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about. It is also usually carefully delineated, which requires followup advice and, hence, more cost.
Austlii was developed in the late 1990s and since then has made
every statute in Australia and every case considered in Australian
courts in most jurisdictions freely accessible online.188 It has since
spread to cover over 200 countries.189 Austlii’s stated aim is to
improve access to justice.190 Its website claims that it has “over
700,000 hits daily.”191 It also competes against commercial
providers such as Westlaw and LexisNexis but has the distinct
advantage of being free to access.
It also has another effect. The free access to law that it provides
has taken the law out of the hands of the law firms and placed it at
the feet of not only citizens, but the law firms’ clients and NewLaw
providers. It gives every citizen the ability to read and interpret the
laws that govern them quickly and for free. The Austlii effect has
created a number of generations of lawyers now who have never
known that laws were once locked up inside a law firm or university
law library. It has, along with the other trends set out above, served
to demystify the law, a trend that will continue to work against the
law firm monopoly.
The five forces that have been outlined in this Part, separately,
and all of them together, are having the effect of eroding the legal
188

See About AustLII, AUSTLII, http://classic.austlii.edu.au/austlii/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2019). This service has been replicated in jurisdictions around the world.
See, e.g., BAILII, http://www.bailii.org/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2019); CANLII,
https://www.canlii.org/en/, (last visited Mar. 17, 2019); see also Graham
Greenleaf, Andrew Mowbray & Philip Chung, AustLII: Thinking Locally, Acting
Globally, 19 AUSTL. L. LIBR. 101, 102 (2011) (“AustLII now publishes decisions
of over 150 Australian courts and tribunals, and we are aiming to publish the
decisions of all courts and tribunals which are of legal interest and relevance.”).
189
See Countries, WORLDLII, http://www.worldlii.org/countries.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2019). Governments too have begun to provide free access to the
official online versions of the laws they make. See, e.g., Federal Register of
Legislation, AUSTL. GOV’T, https://www.legislation.gov.au/ (last visited Mar. 17,
2019) (providing Acts, Bills, and explanatory materials online, free for anyone to
access, read and interpret).
190
Id.
191
See About AustLII, AUSTLII, http://classic.austlii.edu.au/austlii/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2019).
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services industry’s monopoly on providing legal services. As antitrust and competition laws around the world recognize, monopolies
are inherently bad in that they drive up prices, stunt innovation and
create a deadweight loss to society. It is unfortunate that the legal
services industry has taken the path it has in the pursuit of the
business dollar. However, these forces militating against the
monopoly practices of large law firms might not yet spell the death
of the profession as some have predicted, but, instead, see a rebirth
of the professional ideals that mark out a profession in the first
place—only not in the form that one might envision.
VI. HOW WILL DISRUPTION CHANGE THE PROFESSION?
Up until now, I have argued that BigLaw businesses have
strayed from the path of professionalism by exploiting the monopoly
over legal services for profit at the expense of clients. In its pursuit
of profits, the profession has lost the ideal of service to the
community from which it emanates. It might even be argued that the
profession as once envisioned, is already dead. The irony of all of
this is that the lawyer monopoly flourished because law is (or was)
a profession. Because it was formed as a profession, its members
were able to set barriers to entry, to carefully curate its membership
and to self-regulate.
It is unfortunate that the profession was not sufficiently diligent
to ward off the detrimental impacts of a monopoly and to maintain
the altruistic notions of a true profession. Instead, the traits of
economic professionalism and narcissism noted by Dawson and
Halliday192 have grown to define the profession. These should have
been decried and rejected as they arose rather than adopted as
descriptors of the profession.
However, since at least the early 1990s, the legal profession, as
represented by BigLaw, has adopted them with gusto as set out in
Part IV. Clients have long borne the brunt of the monopoly
overcharging and failures to innovate. Society has also worn the
deadweight loss caused by the lost supply of services to those who
cannot afford to access the law. Increasingly, clients and NewLaw
providers have reacted to these monopoly practices and have led the
192
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disruption of the legal services market; armed with greater
knowledge of the law, freer access to it, new technologies to help
find and interpret it, and NewLaw providers. So it is not the
profession as such, or the tenets of professionalism, at which the
disruption is aimed, but at the BigLaw firm business model.
This Part sets out some possible changes to the BigLaw model,
how NewLaw might develop and what change will mean for the
work of lawyers. It also makes some bold claims about the how
lawyers might be replaced by new technology as the new legal
profession. Based on current trends and the predictions already
made in the literature, this Part seeks to predict what the future of
law firms, lawyers and the legal services market might look like in
the next twenty to thirty years’ time.
A. The Impact on the BigLaw Firm Model and the Business of
Law
Ribstein, then Associate Dean and Professor at University of
Illinois College of Law, predicted the “Death of Big Law” in 2010.193
He argued that there were eight pressures on BigLaw including the
rise of in-house counsel, increasing global competition,
“deprofessionalization” of the law practice and the decline of hourly
billing.194 He ultimately concluded that “the real problem with Big
Law is the non-viability of its particular model of delivering legal
services.”195 He could not have foreseen the level of degradation in
the profession, the ferocity of client responses, nor the exponential
improvements in new technology directed at disrupting the BigLaw
model in the succeeding 8 years that will inexorably change the
BigLaw model. Brooks argued that the impact of that technological
change in the long run can extend “beyond where the original
expectations were aimed.”196 That is not good news for BigLaw. As
a result of the current and impending disruption, the BigLaw
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business model is under threat, and the changes look to be
unstoppable.
It is clear that a good part of the systematized work of the junior
lawyer such as research, discovery review and contract review for
due diligence, for so long the entrée into legal work for lawyers, will
eventually be performed by machines involving also perhaps only a
supervising senior lawyer. Furlong noted in 2017 that the decisions
that had been made to cut lower-ranked lawyers in the years after
the financial crisis in 2008 “have evolved into long-term trends
away from hiring new lawyers and towards the eventual elimination
of the traditional associate role in law firms. This trend is likely to
continue for at least the next five to ten years.”197 He also noted that
“associate leverage, which was once 3:1 and 4:1 in many large firms,
has fallen to 1:1 or even less.”198 Larkan, a law firm consultant,
argued that consistent low leverage leads to a range of unsatisfactory
outcomes for partners, lawyers, and clients including that:
“[p]artners are forced to do work that would normally be delegated
down to the lowest competency level. This may mean higher writeoffs, where certain types of work do not justify high rates, and
unhappy clients.”199
Larkan ultimately predicted that “the trend towards lower
leverage is widespread and now well-entrenched [and has] serious
implications for the long-term health of the legal profession in the
U.S. . . . I’m not certain the profession can get itself out of this
situation.”200 As discussed in Part VI, high partner profits are driven
by their ability to leverage the work of junior lawyers. This drop-in
leverage then will have a significant impact on partner profits.
In 2013, in a more optimistic economic analysis of the legal
services market, Currell and Henderson noted that “the continuing
success of BigLaw is in part because of its ability to adjust quickly
to changes in demand by hiring and firing staff”201 and that “by
quickly adjusting the supply of hours, law firms continued to grow
197
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their rates and in many cases increase their profits per partner and
overall earnings.”202 Indeed, Currell and Henderson trumpeted the
success of modern day BigLaw firms “by returns to owners, not
employees.”203 Unconvincingly, they argued that “[o]n this
traditional metric, law firms are doing just fine.”204 This model is
unsustainable and the ability of BigLaw firms to fire their way out
of economic distress and to raise charge out rates and the hours
worked by partners (sometimes at $1000 per hour) are coming to an
end.
Boston Consulting Group predicted that in 5-10 years from
2016:
The traditional pyramid model (few partners at the top and many junior
lawyers and associates at the bottom) will likely give way to an
organization shaped more like a rocket. That new configuration will be
characterized by fewer junior lawyers and associates per partner. Indeed,
the use of technology solutions to handle standard, low-skill legal tasks
could reduce the ratio of junior lawyers to partners by up to three quarters
of the ratio seen in the current pyramid model. However, the law-firm
rocket would be supplemented with other employees who are not
lawyers, such as project managers and legal technicians. Consequently,
the number of employees per law firm would remain similar to today,
while the ratios of high-skilled, specialized legal professionals would
decline.205

All of these changes to the structure of law firms will force them
to develop a different way of billing: a different business model. The
loss of leverage and the cost of retaining new employees who are
not fee earners will eat into the law firm bottom line. Law firm
profits will continue to fall unless an alternative billing system is
devised that creates the same level of profit as the current billable
hour system. For so long, law firms have been able to set and forget
the billing system, but now they will have to create new and
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innovative billing systems that recoup the same amount of profit as
the billable hour model. I am not sure one exists.
Apart from job losses at the lower level and some changes at the
senior level, there will be other changes to the legal services model.
It is likely that large law firms will survive by taking on more and
more specialized and creative legal work. These law firms will
provide specialist legal advice to companies and will charge a
premium fee for their expertise and skill. The largest companies in
the world such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple will need
to retain these law firms to ensure that regulations are developed to
suit them, to protect their power by destroying any claims made
against them, and by providing an effective insurance policy. The
divide between those that can afford power and influence and those
who are its subjects will become extreme. There will be little or no
difference between these firms and the businesses they protect and
serve, and the markings of a profession will cease to apply to these
businesses at all.
The forces outlined in Part V have already led, and will
inevitably continue to lead, to law firms hiring fewer junior lawyers,
but all levels of legal service from the BigLaw to the sole
practitioner will be disrupted. Technologists, with the help of
lawyers, will continue to commoditize legal work and new and
newer technologies will continue to perform more and more
cognitively complex work. As set out in Part V.D, technology is
taking the place of traditional lawyers, whether they are in the
bottom half of a large law firm pyramid or sole practitioners. Despite
the fact that BigLaw and its business model have created the
conditions for disruption, it is possible that these larger law firms
will be able to weather the disruption better in the short term than
sole practitioners and small firms. Larger firms have the financial
strength and depth of clients that will give them a buffer until they
can adjust their business models while the disruption takes full
effect. So, in the short term (say over the next 10-15 years), they will
be able to continue to charge premium prices for bespoke legal
advice in specialized areas to a large (but decreasing) number of
established clients. At the same time, BigLaw firms will continue to
merge in an effort to find efficiencies until there are fewer and fewer
mega-firms servicing only the richest and most powerful
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companies—the Amazons of law if you will. In the ultimate irony,
only BigLaw firms will be able to afford to adopt all of the legal
technology available and they truly will have a monopoly on the
provision of high end legal service.
BigLaw firms have become hothouses for developing new
technologies. By providing the training ground for these new
technologies, BigLaw firms are hastening their development, and by
doing so, are also shrinking the scale and scope of the work that can
be performed by all lawyers. There is a danger that, as is often the
case with new technologies, once these technologies have been
developed and tested in the larger firms, the price for the
technologies will fall and they will be dropped onto the general
market for legal services with potentially devastating effects on all
lawyers. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the BigLaw firms, by
incubating new technologies, are also hastening their own demise.
B. NewLaw Firms, Small Firms and Sole Practitioners
It is likely that the NewLaw structure under which lawyers are
retained on contract to perform commoditized tasks on demand for
a specified price will become the norm. These lawyers may need to
take on other jobs to supplement their diminishing legal work.
Furlong considered that lawyers in NewLaw firms will have to
operate in teams of lawyers, non-lawyers, and clients. He said that
lawyers retained on contract with NewLaw firms would “work from
home, on the road, or at clients’ premises” and to “work wherever,
whenever, so long as the work gets done.”206 This generation of
NewLaw firms would also need to be hyper-responsive to client
demands and “understand . . . the realities of customer service-based
work.”207 Culturally, law firms will be required to jettison
entrenched systems of working such as “billable hours, associate
leverage, hand-crafted solutions, [and an] individualistic ethos.”208
The type of legal work that can be commoditized and performed
by new technologies makes up a greater proportion of the work of
206
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sole practitioners and small law firms. These small firms and sole
practitioners are likely to suffer greater losses over the short term as
technologies continue to improve, and clients’ willingness to shop
around for the best legal advice at the lowest price continues to
squeeze the margins. Taking these paths to one possible conclusion,
in around 30 years’ time, the legal services industry will likely be
made up of two broad legal structures: a diminishing number of
BigLaw firms, and other providers. Those lawyers who choose to
continue to practice law will join any number of disparate providers
of varying legal and administrative services using (or more likely
monitoring) the technologies that will outperform humans in the
medium term. Lawyers will not cease to exist, but there will be less
work for them to perform and there will be very little money paid
for the type of work that will be required of them.
The other forces I set out in Part V such as client reactions to
overcharging, NewLaw providers and new technologies, are likely
to have a compounding effect on the employment prospects of a
larger range of lawyers. As new technologies increase in power and
become more effective, the tasks that they will be able to do will
broaden to include not just manual and systematic tasks, but also
many cognitive and creative tasks.209 When this becomes more
effective, the work of even more senior lawyers will be taken over
by new technologies.
C. Lawyers’ Work
When the edifice of monopoly structures fall and access to law
is open and free, what of the lawyers? Our society will still need
lawyers to create the laws that will respond to new challenges, to
interpret those laws, and to facilitate human transactions. Machines
are not (yet) capable of conscious thought or of understanding the
intricacies of humanity; what it means to be human and to interact
in the world.210 Neither can they be truly creative. Human lawyers
will need to continue to work in the short and medium terms and,
209
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perhaps alongside new technologies, provide a professional service
to clients—but at a lower cost.
Clients will demand more and different services from the new
generation of lawyers. Furlong, a “leading analyst of the global legal
market and forecaster of its future development[,]”211 called the
current generation of lawyers the Pivot Generation because it is
entering law at a time at “which the old legal market collapsed, and
the new legal market coalesced. We will see how one law firm
model faded away and another grew in its place.”212 He argued that
clients will:
seek basic, sufficient products and services rather than expensive, deluxe
solutions. They will be stringent judges of value for money, and they will
not hesitate to haggle or to walk away . . . . To succeed, Pivot Generation
lawyers must make themselves affordable to this market segment—or
they will be rendered invisible.213

Furlong argued that future law firms must “position themselves
within an array of viable competing service options”214 and that they
must “redefine what ‘availability’ will mean to clients in the coming
years . . . . [M]aking a few lawyers and staff available on evenings
and weekend hours should be strongly considered.”215 He anticipated
that customers of the future will want to know “the accurate price—
not the billable hour rate or a guesstimate . . . and expect to be able
to compare the prices charged by several lawyers quickly and easily
online.”216 He recognized that this market is one of “unprecedented
competitiveness.”217
On a somewhat more optimistic note, Furlong argued that, while
this generation of new lawyers is the most vulnerable to the changes
that are affecting the legal services market, they “will not be
victimized by change in the legal market, but will instead lead it,
taking control of and driving this transitional process.”218 However,
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it is not all that clear that the new law firm model will be a place
where lawyers want to work. What will the lawyer of the future be
required to do to fit in with this new way of working?
Lawyers have for so long measured their value in their expert
knowledge of the law, and have been able to commoditize and sell
it. Lawyers acquired that knowledge over at least three years of
postgraduate study at university, and then continually developed
that knowledge throughout their careers. According to Furlong, that
knowledge will form only one small component of a lawyer’s value
in the future. He outlined the other work that he saw would be
required of lawyers of the future, including:
• “knowledge engineers” who display “legal expertise, but
also business intelligence regarding costs and workflow[;]”
• “legal project managers” who would “apply process
improvement techniques to their workflow and systems[;]”
• “pricing officers” who calculate profitability, assess market
intelligence, and “set fixed and ranged fees for their
services[;]”
• “artificial intelligence programmers” with “logical minds
with legal knowledge as well as with basic coding skills[;]”
• “inside counsel” where “institutional, ‘one-client’
employment will surpass law firm employment as the
primary salaried role for lawyers[;]”
• “operational specialists” who could “enhance the
effectiveness and productivity of traditional legal tasks and
workflow[;]”
• “flex-time lawyers” who would “work on a project or
contract basis, often from home” and would “operate on
flexible hours that suit both the buyer and seller of the
services[;]” and
• “preventive lawyers” to minimize “a client’s potential
exposure to legal damages, creating compliance and training
systems to improve the legal behaviour of institution, and
drafting checklists or regimens of healthy legal choices.”219
219
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If this list is not foreboding enough, Furlong reminded us that
lawyers are part of a profession and, as well as displaying all of the
characteristics outlined above, they must also exemplify the values
of “the duty to serve the interest of others, the duty to advance
human dignity, and the duty to defend the rule of law.”220
Professionals such as lawyers, he argued, exemplify “service,
selflessness, higher purpose, and making life better for others. . . .
serving the interests of others, prioritizing those interests above our
own for a greater cause.” He argued that new lawyers should “gear
[their] market interactions, office relations, client deliverables, and
community activities towards improving other people’s
situation.”221 It is difficult to see who would undertake the arduous
list of tasks and do it selflessly in service of a higher purpose. Like
taxi drivers who have faced disruption from Uber and truck drivers
who face disruption from driverless trucks, lawyers must ask
themselves whether it is financially viable for them to continue to
practice law, with all its obligations, including fiduciary obligations
to clients, or find another means of employment. And there is the
rub. Who will be prepared, or even able, to provide all of the services
that Furlong argued that the lawyer of the future will be required to
undertake, and who will be able to do it while still living the ideals
of a professional? That person will also have to do all this within a
business model that replaces the hourly rate—one which, I suggest,
will lead to a drastic reduction in profits.
D. The Professional Algorithm
The ideal entity that will be able to perform or display all of these
characteristics and qualities will be a computer—or a range of new
technologies combined in one platform to seamlessly address all of
a client’s legal needs. This platform of legal technologies will
eventually be able to perform many, if not all of the tasks that
Furlong has set out as those that will be required of the future
lawyer. Computers have knowledge and skills that, if they have not
already, surpass human knowledge. They selflessly work for the
good of the client, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day
220
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without guile or the need for money. They can be programmed to
serve the clients’ needs above their own and to work to the benefit
of society to make life better for others. This is a large part of the
requirements of a profession. The problem with professions as
discussed in this paper is that they have been populated by humans,
whose “hubris and greed”222 has led to them manufacturing a
monopoly and then a business for the pursuit of profit. This has
ultimately led to the downfall of the profession and the disruption of
the law firm model. Computers do not display hubris or greed.
Leaving aside the fact that failures in morals and ethics are
human failings that have seen the downfall of the legal profession,
one has to consider whether computers can provide an adequate
replacement. There are ongoing debates about whether computers
are able to attain or display morals or ethics—two characteristics
that are arguably required of professionals.223 Stahl ultimately
determined that:
There are considerable problems with computers as moral agents even if
one narrows the question down to cognitivist ethics and if one neglects
all of the agency and personhood questions by relying on the Moral
Turing Test (MTT). But even if computers could overcome these, if they
indeed developed an understanding of the meaning of the data they
process, the next question would then be whether this would suffice to
pass a more general MTT. Maybe emotions, physical and spiritual
equality with human beings are necessary for reasoning in a sufficiently
human way. The conclusion of this paper is therefore that moral agency
of computers is not in sight. While it may be principally possible it is not
to be expected soon.224

Therefore, while computers may be able to replicate the
knowledge, skills, and the service aspects of professionals, it may
be some time before a computer fully replaces lawyers as the arbiters
of our laws.
A shift from a human professional to a computer one will not
therefore be an immediate one, but may well develop over time. Like
automated vehicles, this transition from human lawyer as
professional to computer could pass through several stages from
222
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level 0 for no computer use, to level 5 which will be completely
autonomous.225 At level 5, each corporation and each person will
have access to this platform so that access to, and the interpretation
of, our laws will be free, reliable, and consistent and provided
professionally. In this way, the members of our society will have
free access to the laws that govern them. Surely this is an aim of a
civilized society.
VII. CONCLUSION
Susskind questioned whether the proliferation of technology
capable of performing legal work could spell the end of lawyers,226
or the death of the profession.227 The law has shown itself to be
vulnerable to disruption—not only because of technology but
because of the reactions from clients to the consistent overcharging
by lawyers who have had a monopoly on legal services for over one
hundred years. At the same time, law will become more freely
accessible and will be accessed more accurately and quickly by
machines. Technology is merely the tool used to implement the
disruption. A side effect of disruption is redundancy. Today’s
lawyers could be the truck drivers and the taxi drivers of the next
decade. Despite this ominous prediction, disruption can also drive
positive change. Lawyers should not be amassing troops at the
barricades to stave off the advent of new technologies; it is not the
technology that is at fault. The problem lies with something much
deeper in the relationship between a society and those chosen to
develop, interpret and administer its laws.
It should be a goal of society that its citizens, including
companies, should have free access to the laws that govern them at
their fingertips without the need to pay exorbitant fees. Taking the
profit motive out of providing legal services and opening the law up
for free access may just have the effect of returning the law to its
professional roots. The professionals that will prosper in a new era
will be those doing so from a calling, not from a desire to amass
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great personal wealth. Society will still need lawyers to create the
laws that respond to new challenges because machines are not (yet)
capable of conscious thought or of understanding the intricacies of
humanity; what it means to be human and to interact in the world.
In this way, lawyers and legal academics can be part of the rebirth
of the legal profession.
This brings us back to our initial discussion of law as a
profession, as a service to the community. Should we regret or
mourn the demise of the current model of law firm culture? Why
more so than the demise of the taxi and trucking industry? We
should welcome free access to the law without the exorbitant fees
attached to the money men who have guarded the monopoly for so
long. By losing these monoliths, we get closer to law as a profession,
as a service to our fellow man. Surely this should be the aim of a
civilized society—to have its laws available, understood and
analyzed consistently for the benefit of society. In this way, the
wheels of industry will turn and our society will continue to
function, but without the overpriced transaction costs of lawyers.
We should embrace the new paradigm in which law and legal
services are far different, and a more accessible and cheaper option
for the many rather than the cloistered enclave of the privileged few.

